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I 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Background: Traditional safety thinking has been concerned with investigating accident 
causations in order to learn from these. It would be interesting to shift the focus towards 
learning from all the operations that go well in the same manner. After all, the successful 
operations constitute the great majority of all the operations  
 
Objective: The main goal of this master thesis is to study what factors might contribute to 
successful operations in terms of safety. In relation to this it is also relevant to look into the 
definition successful operations.  
 
Method: The empirical study comprises of 10 interviews with people who work on board a 
drilling rig currently operating in Norway. The informants who participated in the interviews 
hold different positions and come from different companies represented on board the rig. 
The thesis does also include a literature review upon related theories. 
 
Results and conclusion: The findings in this study show that it can be difficult to characterise 
or define successful operations. The definition will be subjective; however there are some 
common features of successful operations. Maintaining the life and health of people are the 
number one priority. A successful operation should also result in the intended product even 
though it might take some more time than planned. A successful operation is created by 
many factors and conditions. This study identified 27 factors that might contribute to 
successful operations in terms of safety. It can be difficult to pin point exactly what factors 
that might create a successful operation. A lot of the theory focuses on informal factors 
related to humans and their actions, however the findings in this study implies that there 
must be both formal and informal factors present.  It seems like these are both equally 
important.  
  
II 
 
Sammendrag 
 
Bakgrunn: Tradisjonell sikkerhetstenkning har vært opptatt av å granske årsakene til ulykker 
for å lære fra disse. På samme måte vil det være interessant å flytte fokuset over til å lære 
fra alle de operasjonene som går bra. Vellykkede operasjoner utgjør jo faktisk størsteparten 
av alle arbeidsoperasjoner. 
 
Mål: Hovedmålet for denne masteroppgaven er å undersøke hvilke faktorer som kan bidra til 
vellykkede operasjoner med tanke på sikkerhet. I den sammenheng er det også relevant å se 
på definisjonen av vellykkede operasjoner.  
 
Metode: Den empiriske studien består av 10 intervjuer med personer som jobber på en 
borerigg som for tiden opererer i Norge. Informantene som deltok jobber i ulike stillinger og 
kommer fra ulike selskaper som er representert om bord på riggen. Denne masteroppgaven 
består også av en litteraturstudie av relaterte teorier.   
 
Resultat og konklusjon: Funnene i denne studien viser at det kan være vanskelig å 
karakterisere eller definere vellykkede operasjoner. Definisjonen vil være subjektiv, men det 
er noen fellestrekk ved vellykkede operasjoner. Å ta vare på menneskers liv og helse er 
førsteprioritet. En vellykket operasjon bør også resultere i det ønskede produktet selv om 
det kanskje tar litt lengre tid enn planlagt. En vellykket operasjon blir skapt av flere faktorer 
og forhold. Denne studien identifiserte 27 faktorer som kan bidra til vellykkede operasjoner 
med tanke på sikkerhet. Det kan være vanskelig å peke på nøyaktig hvilke faktorer som er 
involvert. Mye av teorien fokuserer på uformelle faktorer knyttet til mennesker og deres 
handlinger, men funnene i denne studien tyder på at det må være både formelle og 
uformelle faktorer tilstede. Det ser ut som disse spiller en like stor rolle.  
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1 Introduction  
 
In the autumn semester 2013 I was choosing a topic for a project in the course TIØ 4521 
HMS Fordypningsprosjekt. The choice fell upon “successful operations in terms of safety”. 
The project formed the basis for this master thesis and served as a preparation for this 
study. Successful operations and the factors leading to these caught my interest because it 
represents a new way of safety thinking. In traditional safety thinking, the focus is on the 
things that go wrong, such as accident investigations, in order to learn and prevent similar 
things from happening again. Safety is thereby defined by the lack of safety. Accident 
investigations and the study of factors that lead to failure are widely used. Things that go 
wrong draw a lot of attention both from the organisation, authorities, media and the public. 
Such events are often very visible, and in combination with negative consequences, it is no 
wonder they have such a big focus in our everyday life. However one can agree that 
accidents and failed operations make up a very small part of all the operations which are 
performed in an organisation. Most of the time operations tend to go well. If there is so 
much to learn from the small proportion resulting in accidents and unwanted events, then 
there must be a large potential for learning from the opposite side as well. This new way of 
thinking shifts the focus toward all the things that goes right in order to understand normal 
operations and everyday performance. We use our knowledge about accident causations 
and contributing factors to accidents in order to prevent it from happening again. By gaining 
knowledge about the contributing factors which lead to success we can learn from successful 
operations as well. 
There have so far been published few studies on learning from successful operations and the 
factors that lead to success. However organisational learning is a widely studied field.  
 
The interest around the term organisational learning is built on the idea that 
continuous changes and tougher competition require the ability to be 
innovative and develop competence in order to succeed  
(Petroluemstilsynet, 2013) 
 
Today the development of new ideas and technology are increasing in speed, and thereby 
also the need for learning and adapting. Learning from successful operations can help 
companies in the oil and gas industry to decrease the level of risk and thereby enhance 
safety in their operations.  
 
 
2 
 
1.1 Drilling operations 
 
Drilling operations are interesting field of study when it comes to successful operations 
because of their complexity, association with high risk activities and the number of actors 
involved. Drilling operations have many stakeholders, all the way from the operator who will 
profit from the findings of oil and gas to the fishermen whose livelihood will suffer in the 
case of pollution. Accidents in the offshore oil and gas industry have the potential for severe 
consequences and it is in everyone’s interest to ensure successful operations in terms of 
safety.  
The findings at Ekofisk in 1969 represented a flying start for the Norwegian petroleum 
industry, closely followed by other large fields like Statfjord (1974), Gullfaks (1978) and 
Oseberg (1979).  Only last year, 59 new explorations wells were drilled on the Norwegian 
continental shelf, resulting in 20 new findings (Olje- og energidepartementet, 2014). This 
illustrates the extent of the drilling activities. 59 explorations wells were drilled, all consisting 
of a large number of sub operations that was performed without any major accidents.  
Drilling of a well can be performed with several different techniques and by many different 
offshore installations or types of drilling rigs. However the basic drilling system will overall be 
the same. Very simply explained a hole is drilled in the ground by a rotating drill bit. Torque 
is transferred from a power source through a drill string. The use of a drilling fluid that is 
pumped down the drill string help transport the cuttings which are a product of the drilling 
up to the surface. The drilling fluid will also function as lubricate and cool the bit. In order to 
control the pressure one can adjust the weight of the drilling fluid. In addition there is a 
blowout preventer (BOP) which can seal off the well if there is a “well kick” that upsets the 
balance of the system (Jahn et al., 2008). Even though it all sounds quite straight forward 
there are a large number of things which have to be considered during the drilling of a well. 
We’re talking about highly flammable substances under pressure. Not only are we drilling a 
hole in the ground, but the ground in question is placed up to several hundred meters under 
the ocean surface, which can cause challenges related to currents and weather conditions. 
There are several different actors involved in the drilling from different companies. One can 
define these operations as quite complex with many different components affecting each 
other and large amounts of energy involved. A drilling installation is a relatively small area 
where disturbances will spread rapidly through the system. Both the complexity and the 
tight coupling could be recognised from Perrow’s theory of normal accidents.   
 
Based on Normal Accident Theory (NAT) organisations with complex interactions and tight 
couplings, cannot succeed in the long run since these two characteristics combined will 
inevitably lead to major accidents (Perrow, 1984). Examples of this type of organisations are 
nuclear power plants, the aviation industry and also the oil and gas industry. Even though 
accidents do happened from time to time, we do know that these organisations are also able 
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to function well and carry out successful operations in the great majority of their operational 
time. This raises the questions: how is this possible when considering NAT? How can such 
organisations succeed?  The theory of High Reliability Organisations (HRO) may provide 
some answer to this. HRO states that it is in fact possible to avoid accidents if the 
organisation is well designed and managed (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). HRO focuses on 
things that go right despite of disturbances, through preparedness, foresight and flexibility 
(Rosness et al., 2010).   
 
1.2 Deepwater Horizon 
 
In the interview guide the Deepwater Horizon accident was used as an example of a major 
accident (see appendix A). This was used to try highlighting the contrast between a major 
accident and successful operations and as a way of placing the topic of the interview into a 
well-known context. All of the informants were familiar with the Deepwater Horizon 
accident. The following description is mainly based on Tinmannsvik et al. (2011).   
On the evening of 20th April 2010 there was a blow out on the mobile offshore drilling rig 
Deepwater Horizon. The rig was preparing to leave the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico. 
This blow out resulted in explosions and fire, after which the rig sank two days later. 11 
people died in the accident. The rig was going to place a cement plug in the well. During this 
operation the BOP was left open and therefore the only barrier to the reservoir was a 
cement plug at the bottom of the well. The drilling fluid was replaced with sea water, and 
during this operation there were several indications that something were wrong, however 
nothing was done to close in the well. No one noticed the well kick before drilling fluid 
started to pour out on the drill floor. By this point the blowout was so far along that gas was 
already spreading through the installation. This lead to multiple explosions and fire on board 
and the installation sank after two days. The oil leakage from the well was not stopped until 
87 days after the accident (Tinmannsvik et al., 2011).  Accident investigations have revealed 
that this accident was a result of many factors at the same time.  So far there have been no 
blow outs with such severe consequences in Norway, however there have been events that 
possibly could have led to a similar outcome have they not been averted. One example is the 
blowout on Snorre A in 2004 (Schiefloe & Vikland, 2005). Considering this and the fact that 
Deepwater Horizon accident happened as late as 2010, prevention of major accidents and 
what factors that contribute to this is a highly relevant topic.  
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1.3 Scope and limitations 
The scope of this thesis is to do an empirical study to explore what factors can contribute to 
successful operations in terms of safety in drilling operations in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry. In this context it will also be necessary to look at people's perception of successful 
operations. The goal is to try to define successful operations in terms of safety.  
Research questions: 
The objective for this thesis is to look at what factors can contribute to successful operations 
in terms of safety 
The three research questions below are formulated on the basis the problem description in 
the master contract.  
1) What are successful operations in terms of safety? 
 
2) What factors can contribute to successful operations in terms of safety? 
 
3) Give recommendations for further work 
 
Figure 1 presents the structure of this master thesis. Chapter two is based on a literature 
review on the topics related to successful operations. This chapter will shed light on some 
relevant theories and previous research. Chapter three presents the methods utilised in this 
study and the case. In chapter four results and analysis are directly tied to the main 
discussion. Chapter five consists of a summarising discussion and chapter six presents the 
conclusion.  
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Figure 1: The structure of the master thesis 
 
Limitations 
 
Due to the time and resources available the study is limited to a single case which consists of 
a mobile drilling rig operating in Norway and the drilling operations on board this rig. The 
collection of data was conducted by interviews. The main focus of the study is on major 
accidents and organisational accidents, not on individual accidents and risk.  
 
1.4 The research project “Learning from Successful Operations” 
 
This master thesis is a part of the project “Learning from Successful Operations”. The project 
is a collaboration between SINTEF, NTNU, NTNU Samfunnsforskning AS and Safetec. The 
research team does also cooperate internationally with the professors Andrew Hale and Erik 
Hollnagel. The scope for this project is a wish to prevent major accidents through knowledge 
about why accidents do not happen. The goal is to develop methods and tools which the 
industry can use to analyse and learn from successful operations.  
  
This study is a part of a larger research project involving experienced researchers and the 
empirical work will be used further in this project. This has been a great support in the 
writing of the thesis. Even so, the writing of this thesis is an independent work which I have 
conducted by myself.   
Ch.2 Theory   
Ch.3 Methodology 
Ch.4 Results and analysis with main discussion 
Ch.5 Summarising discussion 
Ch.6 Conclusion 
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2 Theory 
 
This chapter presents theories and research related to successful operations and why and 
how operations go well. The theory is meant to shed light on the findings in chapter 4.  
2.1 Complexity and tight couplings 
 
According to Normal Accident Theory (NAT), a system can be defined by its degree of tight 
coupling and complexity. Tight coupling is characterised by a low degree of redundancy 
which leaves little room for improvisation. Disturbance in one part of the system will directly 
affect the other parts, and the disturbance will spread fast throughout the system.  A system 
with high complexity and complex interactions can behave in a way that can be difficult for 
people to understand or foresee. Unexpected or new interactions could suddenly occur. 
Complex interactions results in loss of a complete overview of the system (Perrow, 1984). 
Perrow (1984) has described some strategies to control systems with different degrees of 
tight coupling and complex interactions. An overview of the strategies is displayed in table 1. 
A system with a high degree of complexity can be controlled by decentralisation of the 
organisation. This is because such systems will include tasks that are difficult to standardise, 
non-routine tasks. Such tasks are best handled by the sharp end of the organisation. In a 
tightly coupled system, disruptions will spread rapidly; this will require a fast and well-
coordinated response. Therefore tightly coupled systems are most effectively controlled by 
centralisation. When it comes to systems who are both high in complexity and tightly 
coupled, the strategy become more complicated. Ideally one should both decentralise to 
control complexity and centralise to control tight couplings. However, this is not possible to 
do simultaneously. Therefore, Perrow (1984) argues that this type of systems cannot be 
effectively controlled, and will inevitably lead to accidents.   
 
Table 1: Strategies to handle coupling and complexity (Perrow 1984) 
 Linear interactions Complex interactions 
Tight coupling Centralise to control the 
tight coupling 
Centralise to control the 
tight coupling, but do also 
decentralise to control 
complex interactions 
Loose coupling Centralise or decentralise 
will both be effective 
Decentralise to control 
complex interactions 
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NAT tells us that tight couplings and complex interactions leads to higher risk, and that it will 
be impossible to avoid accidents in such systems. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship 
between tight coupling, complexity and increasing risk. NAT do also tell us that it is not 
possible to prepare for the unimaginable (Perrow, 1984). 
 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between coupling, complex interactions and increasing risk level. 
(Perrow, 1999)  
A drilling rig would be placed in the upper right corner with a high degree of complexity and 
tight coupled systems.   
 
2.2 Resilience  
 
Traditional safety thinking is based on learning from failure and thereby preventing similar 
failures from happening in the future. The focus is on why and how things go wrong. Safety 
is described as freedom from risk (Hollnagel et al., 2011). Since safety is an abstract 
phenomena and very hard to measure, it is usually measured in-directly through the things 
that go wrong. It is widely common to assess the level of safety in an organisation by the use 
of indicators that measure failure. Examples of such indicators could be Fatal accident rate 
(FAR), Lost time injury rate (LTI-rate) or Severe incident frequency (SIF). This traditional view 
of safety has also been called “Safety-I”. In the recent years the focus has started to shift 
towards another type of safety thinking, “Safety-II”. Safety-II has been defined as the ability 
to succeed under varying conditions. The goal of Safety-II is to learn from normal operations 
and the things that go right every day (Hollnagel et al., 2011). One could say that Safety-II is 
equal to Resilience which will be presented later in this thesis. Figure 3 illustrates Safety-I 
versus Safety-II or Resilience.  
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In traditional safety thinking one has a tendency to overlook or maybe even take for granted 
all the operations that go right. One thing that causes this can be habituation. Much like 
when we put on clothes in the morning and after a while our body doesn’t feel that we’re 
wearing them, because the neurons “get used to” the stimulus. The human brain does also 
“get used to” the exposure to all the things that go right since these are in large majority 
compared to the things that go wrong (Hollnagel et al., 2011).   
 
 
Figure 3: Safety-I vs. Safety-II or Resilience (Hollnagel, 2013b) 
 
Successful operations and resilience are closely related, it is therefore interesting to look at 
resilience and resilience engineering in order to understand the processes behind successful 
operations. According to Hollnagel et al. (2006), the focus of resilience engineering is to help 
people cope with complexity when under pressure, in order to achieve success. Resilience 
has been defined as:  
 
“The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions” (Hollnagel et al., 2011 p. 
xxxvi)  
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Resilience engineering resembles HRO in many ways. Redundancy, reconfiguration and 
adaption are central aspects. The difference might be that in resilience engineering these are 
more fundamental aspects, like a normal state, when for HRO this first comes present under 
exceptional conditions (Rosness et al., 2010). Another difference could be that resilience 
engineering is more directed towards management, whereas HRO is about the 
organisational aspects.   
 
Resilience consists of four basic aspects or abilities of a system, illustrated by figure 4. These 
four abilities can be established and managed in different ways depending on the nature of 
the system, but a resilient system must contain at least some of each (Hollnagel et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 4: The four pillars of Resilience (Hollnagel et al. 2011) 
A system must know how to respond to events, both regularities and irregularities. This 
response could be something the system has prepared for in advance, but it is also about 
change and adjustment of its normal function as disturbances occur. The ability to respond 
in the correct way and to know what to do could also be called the “ability to address the 
actual” (Hollnagel et al., 2011). 
 
The ability to monitor ongoing events and the development in such events is called “the 
ability to address the critical” (Hollnagel et al., 2011). The system must be able to monitor 
ongoing developments in its surroundings and consider if these developments are a possible 
threat. Another important aspect is that the system needs to monitor internal developments 
as well as external (Hollnagel et al., 2011). 
 
The “potential” is about anticipating the future. The system must know what to expect of 
potential disturbances, threats, changes and opportunities, and the consequences of these. 
In this way the system can try to prepare for such future events (Hollnagel et al., 2011).  
The last, but not least, is the “factual”. Systems must learn from past events and draw 
experience from this. Resilience seeks to learn just as much from success as from the failures 
(Hollnagel et al., 2011).  
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In resilience the focus has changed from looking at all the things that go wrong and the 
cause of failure, to studying things that actually go right. It aims to understand the causes 
behind success and thereby use this information to further increase success and thus 
prevent failure. Resilience consider both failure and success to be driven by a common 
fundamental process, and one can therefore  get a better understanding of failure by looking 
at success (Hollnagel et al., 2011). 
 
Hollnagel et al. (2006) has described several characteristics of individuals, groups and 
organisations that are experiencing success and successful operations. Among these are the 
ability to recognise and adapt when experiencing disturbances, variations and surprises. This 
ability is important especially in new situations that the system is not originally designed to 
handle (Hollnagel et al., 2006). To recognise disruptions and adapt to these seem to be 
central aspects of resilience. If one shall draw parallels to the four pillars, this would fall in 
under the ability to monitor or to address the critical, and the ability to respond or address 
the actual. In order to respond and adapt to disruptions and changes one must be able to 
recognise and identify ongoing developments. Systems that have the ability to anticipate 
potential disruptions before they occur will have a great advantage in that they can plan and 
prepare the response in advance. Nevertheless it is often impossible to foresee every little 
twist and turn in the situation, and therefore it will be important to be flexible and able to 
change strategies fast. The opportunity and ability to improvise could also be helpful when 
dealing with unexpected turn of events.  
 
2.3 Compliance  
 
Hale & Borys (2011) has described two paradigms related to compliance to rules and 
procedures. Paradigm 1 stated that rules are an essential foundation in order to create 
safety and that failure to comply with rules is a common cause for accidents. This can further 
be described a top-down approach to safety management (Hale & Borys, 2011) On the other 
hand there is Paradigm 2, which is bottom-up orientated and focuses of rules in practice. 
This approach allows “breaking” of the rules and states that this is in fact essential to create 
safety. Rules and procedures shall only sever as guidance. Paradigm 2 considers “breaking” 
of rules as a way of adaption in order to handle complexity and unexpected events (Hale & 
Borys, 2011). 
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2.4 Drift and Efficiency-thoroughness trade-off 
 
2.4.1 Rasmussen’s model of drift 
 
Rasmussen’s model of drift tells us that people is constantly operating within certain 
boundaries. Figure 5 presents three bondaries: the boundary of what is financially 
acceptable, the boundary of unacceptable workload, and the boundary of acceptable risk. 
Crossing the boundary of acceptable risk may lead to an accident or failure. According to 
Rasmussen (1997), both the effort to avoid unacceptable workload and to minimise financial 
costs can steer the operation or activities towards the boundary of acceptable risk(safety). In 
resilience, the goal is to be able to steer the activities close to this boundary, but never make 
a crossing, at least not an irreversible one.  Use of the word “steering” is a good analogy to 
something dynamic, like a steering a ship. This highlights the fact that resilience is not a 
static characteristic of an organisation, but a continuously dynamic process (Hollnagel et al., 
2006). 
 
Figure 5: Model of drift and boundaries. Conflicting objectives tend to make activities 
migrate toward the boundary of acceptable risk. There is ideally a “warning” or proactive 
indicator of some kind when one comes close to the boundary of acceptable risk (Adapted 
from Rasmussen 1997).  
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2.4.2 Efficiency-thoroughness trade-off 
 
“Being thorough as well as efficient is the hallmark of success” 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006 p.3)   
 
The efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) describes the trade-offs people and 
organisations have to do between the resources they choose to spend on planning and 
preparing (thoroughness), and the resources they use on performing the actually task 
(efficiency). These trade-offs are done at all levels of an organisation and by all occupations. 
This is also something people do in their everyday life outside of the workplace.  Thorough 
planning and a lot of time and effort used on this part may contribute to a better and safer 
execution of the operation, because people have the sufficient amount of time to identify 
potential risks. On the other hand, a lot of  time spent on planning and preparing may not 
necessarily be good for production since there will be too little time left to carry out the 
operation. And vice versa, if efficiency is the priority over thoroughness, the operation may 
be badly planned and prepared, and in worst case this can lead to something going wrong. 
The ETTO principle tells us that in order to succeed with an operation, there must be a 
minimum level of both efficiency and thoroughness. That said, it will be impossible to 
maximise both of these at the same time (Hollnagel, 2013a). 
It is expected of people that they are both thorough and efficient at the same time. In many 
cases people do not have the opportunity to choose how they do this trade-off, because of 
limited time and resources. Time pressure can force people to maximise efficiency at the 
expense of thorough planning and preparing. Different situations can demand different 
trade-offs. It is difficult to come up with one definitive answer on how this trade-off should 
be made in a specific situation. This will therefore depend on individual judgment and the 
available resources. How trade-offs are made might also be related to the culture of the 
organisation. Some organisations tend to favour efficiency above thoroughness, and the 
opposite.  
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2.5 Prerequisites for safe operation 
 
Schiefloe (2012) has described 5 organisational prerequisites for safe operation. Figure 6 
illustrates these five prerequisites.  
 
 
Figure 6: Five pre-requisites for safe operations. (Schiefloe, in Albrechtsen 2012)  
(1) Reliability: An organisation that is reliable makes use of good planning and risk 
assessments, an adequate regulatory framework and robust technology and operation. Such 
organisations “make no mistakes”. Good planning and thorough risk assessment implies the 
ability to anticipate potential events of the future. If the people in the organisation know 
what to expect, both from potential threats and opportunities, they can try to prepare for 
these future events. (2) Sensitivity is about being able to detect and understand early 
warning signals. This resembles “the ability to address the critical” in resilience.  A sensitive 
organisation monitors ongoing events and developments and continuously evaluate whether 
this might be a potential threat. (3) The ability to make proactive actions includes corrective 
actions to stabilise and restore balance in the system. This includes both anticipation and 
response. A proactive response will most often be something the organisation has prepared 
for in advance. To be proactive is about always being one step ahead. In situations where 
this is no longer possible, the organisation needs to be reactive (4) and know how to make 
reactive actions. This becomes relevant when disturbance or accidents have already 
happened. Reactive responses can also be prepared in advance in the form of procedures 
and emergency plans, but in some cases the organisation has to make adjustments of its 
normal function that might not be described in any procedure.  The last prerequisite is the 
ability to learn from past events. This could be done by recording and analysing accidents 
and other events, and monitor the statistics of these. The lessons learned should be used to 
further improve all of the four previous prerequisites. 
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2.6 Contributing Success Factors  
 
A study on Resilient Recovery Factors (Størseth et al., 2010) has identified some central 
“Contributing Success Factors” (CSF’s) which can possibly contribute to successful recovery 
in operations. These factors where described as 1) Risk awareness, 2) Response capacity, and 
3) Support. The CSF’s where based on theoretical studies which included both aspects from 
Resilience Engineering as well as other approaches to resilience, and some improvisation 
theory.  
Risk awareness was considered an important factor because failure to recognise risks, or 
underestimation of the risks will often play a major role on the way towards failure (Størseth 
et al., 2010). Underneath Risk awareness and Response there have also been identified some 
sub factors: Risk understanding, Anticipation, Attention and Response. These are based on 
the adaption process in Resilience engineering: Anticipation-Attention-Response(A-A-R) 
(Størseth et al.,  2010). Figure 7 illustrates the A-A-R process. It follows that anticipation, 
attention and response should not be exercised chronologically, this should be a continuous 
process. One can recognise the A-A-R from the four pillars of Resilience. Anticipation in the 
“Potential”, Attention in the “Critical” and Response in the “Actual”. Resilience has by 
Hollnagel et al. (2010, p. xxxvi) been described as “The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust 
its functioning(…..) it is from this implied that adaption is central to “adjust its functioning”. 
Størseth et al (2010) have considered improvisation as an aspect of the adaption process. In 
facing unexpected situations, which often has never occurred before, it is necessary to 
continuously adapt to the new developments. Such situations are rarely described in any 
procedures and it is therefore no clear prescription on how to act. In order to handle the 
situation it may be necessary to use improvisation to some extent.   
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Figure 7: The process of Anticipation-Attention-Response (A-A-R). The system should try to 
learn both from failures and success in order to update its knowledge, and always be 
prepared to respond (Hollnagel et al., 2006). 
 
Robustness, Resourcefulness and Redundancy are three other Contributing Success Factors 
identified by Størseth et al. (2010).  
 
The CSF of Support has its basis in support in decision-making and “sacrifice judgments” 
described by Woods and Wreathall (2003). Sacrifice judgments is when one choose to 
sacrifice production above safety. In order for the decision-maker to know when to stop or 
reduce the production, there need to be some guidelines or in other words decision support. 
    
Størseth et al. (2010) have found that these Contributing Success Factors can be useful both 
in studying cases that have already happened, and as a proactive tool revealing risks in 
potential new situations. 
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2.7 Crew resource management 
 
Crew resource management (CRM) skills are considered the same as non-technical skills, 
which is a term developed by the European aviation industry (Flin et al., 2014). These skills 
have been defined as: 
 
“The cognitive, social and personal resource skills that complement technical 
skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance”  
(Flin et al., 2008, p.1) 
 
The value of non-technical skills or CRM skills in high risk operations have been recognised 
for a long time and unwanted incidents in drilling operations have been connected to lack or 
failure of these skills (Flin et al., 2014).  
 
Flin et al. (2014) have conducted a project where the goal was to identify key categories of 
non-technical skills required by wells personnel. They have used this to create a training 
syllabus for Well Operations Crew Resource Management (WOCRM). The project identified 6 
main categories of WOCRM skills: 
 
1. Situation Awareness 
2. Decision Making 
3. Communication 
4. Team Work 
5. Leadership 
6. Performance shaping factors- stress and fatigue  
(Flin et al 2014) 
 
In table 2 each of the six categories are presented with sub elements. 
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Table 2: WOCRM skills components, adapted from Flin et al. (2014, p. 12) 
Main category Sub elements 
Situation Awareness  Gathering information 
 Understanding information and risk 
status 
 Anticipating future 
state/developments 
Decision Making  Identifying and assessing options 
 Selecting an option and 
communicating it 
 Implementing and reviewing 
decisions 
Communication  Briefing and giving feedback 
 Listening 
 Asking question 
 Being assertive 
Team Work  Understanding own role with the 
team 
 Coordinating tasks with team 
members/other shift 
 Considering and helping other 
 Resolving conflicts 
Leadership  Planning and directing 
 Maintaining standards 
 Supporting team members 
Performance shaping factors- stress and 
fatigue 
 Identifying signs of stress and fatigue 
 Coping with effects of stress and 
fatigue 
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2.8 Error tolerance 
 
Rosness et al. (2008) have discussed the term error tolerance:  
“The ability to stop or change a chain of events which could have led to an 
accident, in such a way that the accident is prevented, or at least the 
consequences are mitigated”  
(Rosness et al., 2008, p.13).  
 
The purpose of error tolerance is that misjudgements, human error and technical failure 
should not automatically lead to accidents. Several factors can help build error tolerance in 
an organisation. Rosness et al. (2008) have pointed out the use of barriers as an important 
factor. Barriers can help recovery by blocking the chain of events that lead to an accident. 
This could be the case both for technical/physical barriers such as gas alarms and fire walls, 
and for more abstract barriers such as procedures and work permits. The barrier could also 
be humans detecting threats, e. g. an operator detect a gas leak. Pariès (2011) has also 
discussed barriers as factor in successful recovery in relation with the airplane that made a 
successful ditching on the Hudson River in 2009, where no lives were lost. The airplane had 
multiple layers of “defence in depth” to manage possible engine failure from birds hitting 
the engines. This is described as “strategic resilience”. As one move through the line of 
defence, one has to sacrifice preferred solutions in order to save what can be saved. The 
pilots of this airplane had to sacrifice the possibility of a safer landing on a nearby runway in 
order to save as many lives as possible. Even though the ditching in the river was more risky 
than landing on a runway, they knew that if they failed at reaching the runway in time, the 
consequences would be far more severe (Pariès, 2011). Multiple barriers that make up 
“defence in depth” can be important contributions to success if they work as intended. For 
this to be the case, one has to make sure the barriers are independent. There is little use in 
multiple barriers against the same threat if all of the barriers are being put out of function by 
one common failure (Rosness et al., 2008). A gas alarm and a fire extinguisher system not 
working because of failure in the main power supply can be an example. After all barriers are 
only intended and designed to work in foreseen situations.  
 
Another factor that contributes to error tolerance is the level of competence among the 
operators. A high level of competence, knowledge and skills will make the operator more 
prepared to handle unwanted and unforeseen situations (Rosness et al. 2008). When there 
is no clearly defined prescription on how to act, competence and experience could help 
compensate. A high level of competence could maybe also increase the operator’s ability to 
detect unwanted and unforeseen developments at an early stage and thereby increase the 
chances of a recovery. In order to build error tolerance the organisation need to encourage 
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people to correct others when they see colleagues making misjudgements and errors. The 
organisation needs to build a culture where this is an acceptable practice among everybody. 
It also needs to be room for mistakes without creating any scapegoats or accidents (Rosness 
et al. 2008). Error tolerance consists of barriers, robust work practice and improvisation.   
2.8.1 Robust work practice  
Robust work practice has been described as: 
 
«The small actions skilled professionals do to protect themselves and others 
from hazards that may occur during the execution of the work” (Tinmannsvik 
2008 p. 13) 
 
An example can be when a person notify a colleague who is about to do something wrong, 
that can lead to negative consequences for him or others. Another example can be the 
operator taking two minutes to mentally go through the task and related risks before he 
starts. Robust work practice could be a way of building error tolerance (Skjerve, 2008). 
According to Skjerve (2008), robust work practice is to a great extent based on the 
individual’s own thinking and interpretation of the situation. This means there is no 
“blueprint” on how people consider the situation. One person may decide to intervene in a 
safety critical situation, where another person does not see this as necessary. Because of this 
one might say that there is a lot of uncertainty related to this type of robust work practice. 
How different individuals interpret the same situations can vary a lot depending on what 
kind of experience they have and if they have encountered a similar situation earlier.  
Robust work practice and how people think about situations are based both on rules and 
procedures and on their previous knowledge. The process of robust work practice does also 
take place in both a formal and informal context (Rasmussen, 1986). The organisation can 
include this as a routine by incorporating such practice into the procedures and work 
prescriptions; “take-two” can be an example of this. “Take-two” is a term used for stopping 
the operation and taking a few minutes to evaluate the situation. The organisation can also 
train its personnel in how to apply different methods of robust work practice in their daily 
work. In the more informal context, there is a great variety in how people exercise this type 
of work practice. Since there are no procedures or descriptions on how this shall be done, it 
becomes very individually dependent. As mentioned earlier people’s perception and 
judgment can be strongly related to their knowledge and past experience. People will also 
be influenced by their colleagues. An apprentice or new employee will most likely adopt the 
same practice as the colleagues he or she works with on an everyday basis. This is related to 
safety culture and the informal norms and attitudes in the group and organisation.    
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2.8.2 Improvisation 
Andresen et al. (2008) have described improvisation as: 
 
“A high degree of proximity (in time) or correlation in time between 
composition / planning and execution of an action” (Andresen et al 2008 
p.122) 
 
The acts of improvisation do not necessarily lead to success every time, but it can be a way 
of increasing the likelihood of success. Improvisation is something that can be done both by 
individuals and groups (Andresen et al., 2008).  
 
In unexpected situations one often relies on the skills, knowledge and experience of 
individuals in order to make successful improvisations. Confidence in yourself and your 
colleagues will also be of importance (Andresen et al., 2008). The successful ditching on the 
Hudson River is also an example on how improvisation can turn a very severe situation into a 
successful recovery. The decision to ditch the plane into the river was an act of improvisation 
(Pariès, 2011). 
 
The opportunity to improvise in unexpected and unknown situations will often depend on 
the organisation. In many cases it is the organisation that set up the boundaries within 
where the individuals and groups can act (Andresen et al., 2008). Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche 
(1999) have identified three main characteristics of an organisation, which can promote 
improvisation. 1) The organisation must have an experimental culture. This is the type of 
culture that allows people to try new things and experiment. 2) The organisation must have 
minimal structure, and management and control should instead be carried out indirectly 
through the organisation’s culture and ideology. 3) The organisation should also have a low 
procedural memory, which means little formalised procedures and prescriptions on how the 
different work tasks shall be solved.  
 
Successful improvisation can also be influenced by the organisation’s ability to adjust the 
operational mode, reallocate resources and use these available resources in a flexible 
manner (Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche, 1999).  
Weick (1995) has pointed out that promotion of improvisation can help build trust and close 
relations among colleagues, and that this will improve cooperation and interaction during 
stressful situations and time pressure.  
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2.9 Mindfulness 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) have explained mindfulness as the ability to see the bigger picture. 
This is when people do not only consider single actions, but also the context where the 
actions are carried out. At the same time they focus on how details differ. When speaking of 
mindfulness, the context can be described as the bigger picture of the moment. Mindfulness 
is also about noticing development of the unexpected. When working in complex systems, 
mindful organising could be one factor which contributes to success in the way that such 
organising give people the chance to detect unexpected developments and stop or change 
the course of these, or adjust and restore functions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Mindfulness 
involves five principles, divided into two groups:  Anticipation and Containment (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  The principle of anticipation includes being 1) focused on details, 2) focus 
on potential failure, and 3) being sensitive to the operation. If one is preoccupied with 
failure, one might be able to pick up early signals of development of unexpected events. 
Being focused on details can prevent weak signals of unexpected developments from being 
missed or overlooked. A low degree of differentiation among such details can prevent the 
ability to detect important signals of new unexpected events. Being sensitive to the 
operation means that one have to consider the whole context and adapt the intentions from 
plans and design to the specific context applicable to the specific operation. The context is 
something that is often not considered in planning of the operation. The principle of 
anticipation can be recognised from the concept of anticipation in resilience. Anticipation is 
about detecting and preventing unexpected developments. The principle of containment is 
used when unexpected events continue to develop. Where anticipation is about being 
proactive, containment is about being reactive. Containment includes 4) commitment to 
resilience and 5) respect for expertise. Resilience, in this sense, means the ability to maintain 
the original functions of the system when exposed to disruptions. This can be compared to a 
rubber band returning to its original shape after being stretched. This ability implies 
knowledge on how to use existing practice in new ways, a wide range of response 
repertoires, the ability to control emotions in stressed and chaotic situations and rich 
information sharing. Respect for expert judgments is about leaving the decision making to 
experts rather than the management. Experts, especially in the sharp end of the organisation 
often possesses valuable knowledge about the operation that can in fact make them more 
capable in decision making than people that is higher in rank (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
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2.10 Sensemaking 
 
According to Haavik & Wærø (2012) it is important to look at the relationship between work-
as-imagined and work-as-done in order to understand the factors which lead to resilient 
operations. Work-as-imagined are the prescriptions, procedures and plans made in advance 
on how the work operation should be done. This is the intended way the operation should 
be carried out. On the other hand there is work-as-done, which is the work practices that 
actually is done. The work-as-done will most often be very alike the prescriptions on how the 
work is to be carried out, but it will also be coloured by how people interpret different 
situations and how they make sense of these (Haavik & Wærø, 2012). 
 
Sensemaking is defined as the processes where people give meaning to observations and 
experiences (Weick, 1995). Sensemaking are closely related to decision-making, 
understanding and interpreting (Schiefloe, 2013). Haavik & Wærø (2012) found that the 
process of sensemaking was influenced by people’s theories and models conceptualizing 
safety and risk. Clegg et al (2008) have described seven characteristics of the sensemaking 
processes. 1) The processes are on-going in the sense that people are making sense of 
situations all the time. 2) The processes are retrospective in the way that people make sense 
of things by interpreting present situations in the light of the past. 3) People consider their 
interpretations to be “good enough” to make up a basis for their actions. In other words, the 
sensemaking processes are plausible. 4) The processes are built on images because people 
work with models, plans and mental maps. 5) People try to make the meaning of things 
more clear and justifiable by rationalising. 6) Organisations of today do often have a lot of 
technology for information processing. However sensemaking is performed by people. 7) 
Last, but not least, the processes of sensemaking is connected to actions. Thinking and 
actions define one another (Clegg et al., 2008). It is not always easy to define the “correct” 
sensemaking in a given situation, but good sensemaking can help improve management 
(Schiefloe, 2013). Managers should try to obtain as correct and comprehensive picture as 
possible, both of the organisational system as a whole and of specific situations (Schiefloe, 
2013). 
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2.11 Learning and knowledge 
 
2.11.1 Tacit and explicit knowledge 
Jacobsen & Thorsvik (2007) have described tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge is the knowledge that individuals carry. This knowledge is hard to describe and 
therefore difficult to share with others. This tacit knowledge is based on experience that 
individuals develop over time. It is common that individuals are not aware of the knowledge 
they possess, it is just something they make use of without reflecting upon it (Jacobsen & 
Thorsvik 2007). On the other hand there is explicit knowledge. This is the shared knowledge 
in the organisation and among colleagues. Explicit knowledge are often found in procedures 
and written routines (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2007).  
2.11.2 Single loop learning and double loop learning 
 
Argyris & Schön (1996) have presented the theory of single loop learning and double loop 
learning. This theory is based on people’s behaviour being motivated by a goal, something 
we wish to achieve. However in some cases people can experience that the things we work 
to achieve are not really the same things that we wish. The theory of single and double loop 
learning describes the learning when people are starting to realise this. The focus changes 
from being occupied with how to do things better, also called single loop learning to looking 
at the overall goals behind the actions, double loop learning. The focus shifts from how to 
why (Jacobsen & Thorsvik 2007; Argyris & Schön 1996). Figure 8 illustrates the two types of 
learning. 
 
Figure 8: Single and double loop learning (Adapted from Jacobsen and Thorsvik 2002, p. 
326) 
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2.11.3 Exploration and Exploitation in organisational learning 
 
March (1991) has distinguished between exploration and exploitation in organisational 
learning. Central terms in exploration are experimentation, risk taking, variation, search, 
discovery, innovation and flexibility. Exploration can be described as finding new possibilities 
(March, 1991). Exploitation consists of terms like production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, refinement and execution. Exploitation can be described as utilising old 
certainties (March, 1991). 
Organisations must do a trade-off between exploration and exploitation. Favouring 
exploration above exploitation could lead to large costs without that many benefits. This 
would result in too many undeveloped ideas with little distinctive competence (March, 
1991). On the other hand, favouring exploitation at the expense of exploration could lead to 
a “suboptimal stable equilibria” (March, 1991, p.71) 
 
2.12 The Pentagon model 
 
The Pentagon Modell by Schiefloe is a tool for cause analysis, which can also be used in the 
collection of data and analysis of correlations and interactions. The model can be used on 
different organisational levels, from individuals to the general organisational structure. As 
the name implies, the Pentagon model involves five aspects that affects safety critical work 
in an organisation. Figure 8 illustrates these five aspects.   
Formal structure is often described as “organisation” or “organisational factors”. This 
includes roles and responsibility, authority, procedures and regulations and staffing, among 
other things related to the formal structure of the organisation (Schiefloe, 2013). 
Technology includes all the tools, machinery, equipment, ICT-systems and material 
infrastructure that the employees use to do their work. Maintenance, operating routines 
and the equipment’s condition is also relevant for the technology-aspect. Technology has to 
been seen in relation to formal structure because different types of technology and 
equipment have different requirements regarding procedures and management, and the 
other way around (Schiefloe, 2013). 
Culture includes factors as language, values and norms, attitudes and habits, 
competence/knowledge, symbols and expectations on how the work shall be done. The 
aspect of culture covers what people understand, know, think and believe (Schiefloe, 2013). 
Social relations and Network covers the information structure, network structure and social 
capital in the organisation. It tells us something about the relationship between individuals, 
but also between groups or alliances. Key words here are trust, friendship, sharing of 
knowledge and experience, alliances and power, competition and conflicts (Schiefloe, 2013). 
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Interaction is how the people in the organisation communicate, cooperate and coordinate. 
People adapt, interact and influence each other. This aspect also includes leadership and 
information flow. Interaction is a precondition for social relations and network, and a 
foundation for organisational culture, learning and transfer of experience (Schiefloe, 2013) 
 
 
Figure 9: The Pentagon Model (Schiefloe, 2013) 
 
It is important to consider all of the aspects as dependent of each other to a greater or less 
extent. Changes in one of the aspects can have impact on the others (Schiefloe, 2013). By 
considering all of these aspects when studying an organisation or an event, such as an 
accident, one can get a better understanding of the “bigger picture”. It can also be a great 
help for sorting and systemising information.  The pentagon model has been used for cause 
analysis after accidents and failure, for instance in connection with the blow out on Snorre A 
in 2004.  
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3 Methodology 
 
 
This chapter presents the methods that were used in this study. There is also a presentation 
of the strengths and weaknesses related to these methods. 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
This study is performed as a qualitative study. If we are to compare quantitative and 
qualitative research, qualitative research focuses on word-based descriptions rather than 
the quantitative numbers and statistics. In qualitative research there is often an inductive 
point of view where observations lead to a theory or hypothesis (Bryman, 2012). A 
qualitative research design do also often emphasise the participant’s point of view: 
 
….the stress is on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the 
interpretation of that world by its participants. 
       (Bryman, 2012, p.380) 
 
The approach in this study was to obtain rich word-based data from interviews, especially on 
organisational and social processes. Therefore, based on the properties of qualitative 
research methods, this seemed to be the most adequate design for this study.  
 
Case 
 
This study is built up with a case study design. A case study focuses on a single case; it could 
be a person, a group, an organisation or an event or situation, among other things. However, 
case studies are not only limited to qualitative research (Bryman, 2012).  
According to Yin (2009) case studies can be divided into five categories: the critical case, the 
extreme or unique case, the revelatory case, the longitudinal case and the representative or 
typical case. Bryman (2012) has named the latter one “exemplifying case”. It is most 
reasonable to categorise the case in this study as an exemplifying case. This type of case can 
be seen as an example of a wider category. In this study the case could turn out to be an 
example of a wider category comprising successful operations in drilling in Norwegian 
sector.  
 
This is a case which is based on drilling operations on a rig currently operating in the 
Norwegian sector. This rig has been operating internationally in several other places in the 
world. The rig was recently brought to Norway to drill in the North Sea. In connection to the 
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transition to Norwegian sector there was a major change of crew. Nearly the entire drilling 
crew was replaced with a Norwegian crew. The new crew consisted of both experienced and 
quite new employees. The rig has a contract with a consortium of five operator companies.  
 
The case was conducted through interviews. People in different positions have been 
interviewed to ensure as wide a range of perceptions as possible. People’s point of view 
might vary depending on their position and type of work and responsibilities. Eight out of 
the ten interviewees came from the rig contractor company, one person was from the 
operator company and the last one was employed by a third party service company. The 
majority of the informants come from the rig contractor company because they represent 
the largest group on board the rig compared to the service companies. There are only a few 
people representing the operator company on board.  
 
3.2 Literature study 
 
In order to build the theoretical framework for this master thesis, a literature study was 
carried out. This can be described as a narrative review. The goal of a narrative review is to 
gain an initial impression of the topic area and is thus a more uncertain process of discovery. 
A narrative review will often be ranging over a wider scope and be less focused than a 
systematic review (Bryman, 2012). The search for literature was mainly conducted during 
the previous fall semester when I wrote a project preparing for this master thesis. A 
literature study is a way of mapping the existing research and publications on the chosen 
area. Knowledge about the findings in previous research can be helpful in assessing the 
relevance and significance of your findings. A literature study is not just about giving a pure 
reference of the findings of others, but to use these findings and theories to underpin your 
own results and interpretations (Bryman, 2012).  Previous research and other literature 
related to the topic have been used as a foundation for the theory chapter and the 
discussion of the results.  
 
The literature search was carried out primarily by the use of BIBSYS, which is the university’s 
library search engine and Google Scholar. References to additional literature were also given 
by the supervisors and members of the research team. When using public internet-based 
search engines it is important to bear in mind that the sources might not always be equally 
reliable. It is important to look at the findings with a critical eye and evaluate the quality and 
reliability of your findings (Bryman, 2012). In selecting relevant literature, the focus was on 
relatively recent publications; however some older publications also proved useful. 
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3.3 Interview 
 
In this study, 10 interviews were carried out with individuals. The purpose of the interviews 
was to gather empirical data in order to answer the research questions. All the interviews 
were conducted over a period of four weeks. The interviews lasted from 30-60 minutes. 
Some of the interviewees were at home while others were at work on the rig. When 
performing this study the goal was to interview people in several different positions. A 
Roughneck might have a different perspective and emphasise on other factors than a driller 
or a toolpusher.  
 
The data collection was based on qualitative interviews. The interviews could be 
characterised as semi-structured, which means there is an interview guide with certain 
topics and questions, however the interviewer is not very conservative with respect to this 
guide. There is room for an open conversation, and new input is encouraged. A semi-
structured interview allows the interviewee to talk about topics besides the questions in the 
interview guide and the interviewer will often ask new questions related to this. The topics 
and questions in the interview guide may not be asked in the exact order they was written, 
however most often all the topics will have been touched upon by the end of the interview 
(Bryman, 2012).   
 
Before the interview started the interviewees were informed of their rights related to the 
project and the interview. They were informed that they could choose to withdraw from 
participating in the project at any time during or after the interview. The interviewees did 
also give their oral consent regarding use of a recorder.  
 
The interview guide was developed by the research team and consisted of 7 main topics with 
subsequent questions (See appendix A). The questions were developed on the basis of 
different theoretical perspectives addressed in two workshops. I did not participate in the 
development of the interview guide myself, but both of my supervisors did. In consultation 
with my supervisors we agreed that this interview guide served my purpose. Since the 
interview guide was made to cover a wider range of topics than the scope of this thesis, 
some of the 7 main topics are not directly related to the research questions. However these 
are included nevertheless because they can help shed light on the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
Strengths and weaknesses related to the interviews 
 
Nine out of ten interviews were recorded. Recording the interviews can be a great 
advantage because it gives us the opportunity to collect every bit of data provided by the 
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interviewee, not only what we have the time and memory to write down. In the tenth 
interview the recorder was not operating. However, this was discovered immediately and 
the interviewer sat down with his notes and produced an extensive summary.  Bryman 
(2012) point out that concentrating on taking notes in parallel while interviewing might 
distract the interviewer and make it difficult to catch important information given by the 
interviewee. Even though recording can be very useful, it is important to bear in mind that 
this could affect the interviewee’s responses. People can be less open and more self-
conscious when they know they are being recorded (Bryman, 2012).  
 
The recorded interviews were transcribed in full, word by word by me. This was a time 
consuming process, however it was a great help in the process of initial analysis (Kvale, 
1996)  
 
During 6 of 10 interviews conducted in this study there were two or three people present, 
one person had the role as interviewer while the one/two others made notes as backup in 
case there was any technical problems with the recording. Another strength when 
conducting the interviews as a group is that the data from the interviews where discussed 
immediately afterwards. This enriched the initial analysis of the interview. This also helped in 
preparing for the next interview. Due to practical reasons and logistics I only had the 
opportunity to participate on 4 of the interviews. My external supervisor who is a part of the 
research group participated on all the 10 interviews.   
 
Due to practical concerns the interviews were conducted by telephone. Telephone 
interviewing can make it difficult to create the same relation and interaction between the 
interviewer and interviewee, as if they were face-to-face. It will also make it impossible to 
observe or use body language. That said there is no definite evidence that interviewees will 
answer differently in a telephone interview compared to a face-to-face interview (Bryman, 
2012). There were some minor problems regarding the sound quality of the recording, which 
possibly would have been better if the interviewee was in the same room as the recorder; 
however this did not significantly affect the transcription.  
 
Sampling 
 
The sampling in this study can be described as purposive. This means the participants were 
not chosen entirely randomly. Purposive sampling is often preferred in qualitative research 
in contrast to probability sampling, where the goal is to have a more random selection 
(Bryman, 2012). The initial sampling was based on a list of desired positions on the rig that 
was sent to the rig contractor. The company suggested 4 candidates in different positions. 
One of these informants was asked if he could provide us with some more candidates in 
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order to get a wider range in work positions, including people from the Operator Company 
and service companies. As follows 6 new people were interviewed. Table 3 presents the 
range of positions. The informants will later be referred to as informant A-J. The positions in 
table 3 are listed randomly and are therefore not directly corresponding to informant A-J.  
 
Table 3: The informants’ positions 
Mud logger 
Senior toolpusher 
Subsea section leader 
Technical section 
leader 
Driller 
Senior cementer 
Roughneck 
Company man 
Rig Superintendent 
 
The informants’ work experience in the offshore industry ranges from a few years to over 20 
years. Table 4 presents the distribution in experience.  
 
Table 4: Years of working experience 
Work experience: Number of respondents 
< 10 yrs. 2 
10-20 yrs. 4 
>20 yrs. 4 
 
The majority of the informants are within the interval 10- >20 years.    
 
3.4 Analysis 
 
The three first phases of the analysis process is; 1) immediate while the interview is ongoing, 
2) directly after the interview and 3) during the transcription and review. The analysis can be 
described as an ongoing mental process that already started during the first interview (Kvale, 
1996). However since I was not present at all the interviews my main initial analysis was 
conducted during the transcription phase, thus I conducted phase 3 of the analysis. When all 
the empirical data was collected the information in the interviews were summarised in table 
form. The information was divided into categories reflecting the topics of the interview 
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guide. In addition some new categories were also created on the basis of topics introduced 
by the informants. This facilitated comparisons and interpretations in an organised manner 
and created a basis for further analysis of factors that might contribute to successful 
operations. The contributing factors were addressed in a separate analysis. This analysis was 
based on the five categories from the Pentagon model by Schiefloe (see chapter 2.12). 
Thagaard (2003) has described a main separation in qualitative analysis. One type of analysis 
focus on the significance of how the informants express themselves rather then what they 
express, while the other type focus on the content in the text. The analysis in this study can 
be described as the latter; the focus is on the content in the text.  
 
3.5 Strengths and weaknesses 
 
The external validity or generalizability of case studies are two aspects that have been 
pointed out as possible weaknesses. This is because the results and findings from a case 
study might be too specific for that single case, and thus it will be difficult to generalise these 
findings to other cases (Bryman 2012). 
The goal of this study is not to generalise, but to obtain an understanding of the topic. One 
advantage by doing a qualitative case study is the opportunity to immerse in a single case in 
order to get a fuller understanding of the topic. This goal was achieved in the way that the 
informants’ perceptions, opinions and experience with successful operations was uncovered 
and elaborated and thus a deeper understanding of the topic was obtained.  
 
Bryman (2012) has described reliability whether or not the study is repeatable. Reliability in 
this study will be about all the interviews being performed in the same way and the same 
questions being asked. Kvale (1996) has pointed out that the reliability of qualitative studies 
can be “disturbed” because the interview does often have the form of a conversation. This 
can also be said to be the case in this study. The fact that there are different interviewers 
can also contribute to such a “disturbance” of the reliability. However Kvale has argued that 
the term reliability is best used in quantitative studies (Kvale, 1996). Even though the 
interviews proceeded slightly differently, all the informants were asked about the same 
topics and had the same opportunity to present their view. One could say that the reliability 
would be stronger by the use of very structured interviews or questionnaires where there is 
no room for diverting from the questions. However, in this study the goal was to obtain as 
rich and wide picture of the topic as possible and a semi-structured interview was therefore 
most appropriate.   
 
The internal validity is about whether we measure what we want to measure (Bryman, 
2012). In this case it will be whether we are actually studying successful operations. Based 
on this one could argue that the validity in this study is good because the empirical study has 
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given answers to the research questions. The informants did in fact give information about 
successful operations.  
 
The case in this thesis was studied only through interviews. It would clearly have been an 
advantage to conduct observations as well. Observations of how the work and operations 
are done in practice would add another dimension to the results because it is likely that the 
informants could have missed out on some factors. This could be things that they do not pay 
much attention to on an everyday basis simply because it is so normal and ordinary to them.  
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4 Results, analysis and discussion 
 
 
In this chapter I will present the findings from the interviews together with discussion of 
these findings. The analysis is divided into two: 1) Findings based on the analysis of each 
topic from the interview and 2) Analysis of contributing factors to successful operations. I 
have chosen to merge the results and discussion in order to create more flow in the text.  
 
In order to analyse and discuss the factors that might contribute to successful operations 
that were identified from the interviews I have divided them into five groups much inspired 
by the pentagon model (Schiefloe 2013). In chapter 5 I have discussed the findings in relation 
to the research questions. 
 
4.1 Background and experience 
 
The majority of the informants have long experience from working in the offshore industry. 
8 of the 10 informants have more than 10 years of experience. These people have worked in 
different positions throughout their career and some of them have worked both in 
Norwegian sector and international. This rich experience and variety of positions makes 
these informants provide a broad view on the topic of successful operations.  
 
One will often consider the most experienced employees to be the ones who are the most 
aware of changes or best able to come up with problem solutions. You might be able to 
handle a situation or problem better if you’ve previously experienced something similar. 
That said one shall not underestimate the value of less experienced colleagues. They often 
have a way of looking at things in a different light. If you’re new, you might be more open to 
new solutions and new ways of performing the operation. From the interviews one has 
heard stories about people with long experience refusing to make use of new suggestions 
because “this is the way we’ve done things around here for 30 years”. However it seems like 
this kind of attitude is more and more belonging to the past. This will be discussed further 
later in this chapter.    
 
4.2 Why the rig has not experienced a major accidents 
 
When asked the question about why their rig has not experienced a major accident like 
Deepwater Horizon several of the informants point out the complexity of such an accident. 
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They believe that such an accident had many causes and probably started already in the 
planning phase. Many things went wrong in advance and during the accident.  
 
Requirements, regulations, guidelines and good procedures are described as some of the 
reason why they have not experienced such an accident. One informant emphasise that the 
regulation is a lot stricter and have a stronger position in Norwegian sector. Requirements 
and guidelines are taken seriously by everyone on board. Not everyone read specific 
procedures related to all the operations they do, but everyone is informed on what is 
allowed and not allowed and how it should be done according to procedure.  
 
The importance of good reporting is spoken of by a couple of the informants. By good 
reporting they mean that every little incident shall be reported as a way of preventing bigger 
accidents. They say that it is important that everyone is active and that everyone can give a 
heads up or a warning if they see something that doesn’t seem right. One informant does 
also talk about focusing on the bigger picture as a way of preventing accidents. He says that 
details are important, but you must be able to place these into a bigger context.  
Almost everyone mention the open culture on board and the relatively flat organisational 
structure. Some say that there was probably more hierarchy in the organisations related to 
Deepwater Horizon. The more open culture in Norway allows everyone to utter their 
opinion, make suggestions and ask questions. Everyone communicates with everyone, no 
matter what positions they have. All the informants confirm the low time and efficiency 
pressure. Anyone can say that the operation needs to be stopped if they see something 
that’s about to go wrong or something that doesn’t seem right. The operation will be 
stopped and everyone takes a few minutes to think through how it can be done better. It’s 
important not to doubt each other’s judgement on this. Everyone agree that it’s ok to use a 
bit more time to make sure the operation is performed properly and as safe as possible, this 
also includes the operator company.  
This is consistent with robust work practice as described by Skjerve (2008). Robust work 
practice requires that you have the adequate latitude, that you have time to «take two» and 
to stop the operation and change the plans.   
 
Two of the informants talk about the high level of education and training among the 
Norwegian crew. Another one emphasise the importance of involving everyone, especially 
the newest and youngest on board.  
 
“They can often notice things that the more experience of us do not see” – Informant 
D 
 
He also says that planning is important and that everyone knows what is happening.  
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The informants have a lot of suggestions of why this rig has never experienced a major 
accident, however some point out that there have been incidents in Norway that could have 
ended just as bad. It would therefore be wrong to say that this could never happen in 
Norwegian sector.  
 
The informants’ perception of their contribution 
 
When asked about their contribution to avoid major accidents the informants’ answers vary 
based on their position and work responsibilities. However some things are repeated. 
Several say that they focus on reporting and passing on information if they see something 
wrong or something that might lead to a problem. They focus on always giving the correct 
information. Several of the informants do also say that they are occupied with following 
procedures as a means of avoiding major accidents. And last but not least they talk about 
the importance of being one step ahead and planning for what might happen.  
 
Two of the informants say that the equipment has a special focus, and they always make 
sure they have the right equipment for the job and that the equipment is functioning 
properly.  
 
The informants in leadership positions focus on a close follow-up with every section, well 
control and making the right decisions depending on the surrounding conditions. One of 
them described the challenges related to weather conditions. Since you cannot always just 
press the button and disconnect the drilling equipment at any time, you have to assess each 
situation and plan ahead. It is important to know the time limits related to the weather.  
 
One informant says that he and his colleagues try to look out for each other, especially when 
working with heavy machinery on the drill floor.  
 
4.3 Critical phases and pure luck 
 
Some of the informants talk about the critical phases of a drilling operation. These critical 
phases will typically be when drilling close to or inside the reservoir. They describe some 
focus areas related to this phases. Such a focus area could be to check the mud weight more 
often and having an extra person on the drill floor. There is also a pre job meeting before 
such an operation. On this meeting they discuss what is going to happen and they have 
designated tasks appointed to them in case something unwanted do happen. It is important 
that everyone involved have a clear picture of the potential situations that might occur.   
 
36 
 
When asked about luck and if they feel something went well due to pure luck none of the 
informants have any example. It seems like the term “pure luck” or luck at all is not widely 
used or spoken of on the rig. The concept of luck might be considered somewhat 
unprofessional. It is possible that luck is perceived to be incompatible with good skills, 
knowledge and education.  
 
4.4 New crew and new in Norway 
 
This rig has been operating internationally for the past few years and was recently brought 
to Norway. When the rig came to Norway there was a change of crew and a major part of 
the crew was new on the rig.  
Due to the rig being new in Norwegian sector they have not developed the same procedure 
system as other well-established companies in Norway. The crew are very much involved in 
making the guidelines and internal procedures. One informant says that this means that they 
have to evaluate the operations they are about to do a bit more than others, operations that 
might be routine in other places. He believes this can be an advantage and that they focus 
on how to do things in alternative ways: 
 
“We have to do things in new ways and not just do things the way it has always been 
done” – Informant A 
 
 
He also says that the personnel receive good training and the more experienced personnel 
are important. There are a lot of young people on the rig, but the people in leading positions 
are very experienced. Another person confirms that a core of people with long experience 
from this rig remained when they came to Norway and he think this has contributed to 
maintaining the good culture. One of the more experienced informants says that they take 
into account that many of the crew members are new and they focus on building 
competence: 
“It is important that everyone learns how things are done and how the 
procedures are to be followed” – Informant I    
 
There seem to be an overall opinion that the new crew consist of very skilled and educated 
people who know what they are doing. Some say that there is a very high standard among 
Norwegian drilling crews in general. One mention that there have been some minor issues 
regarding unfamiliar equipment, but everything has exceeded all expectations. One of the 
informants says that working with them same people and people you know contribute to 
good routines and safe work. This is also confirmed by others. Many of the new crew 
members have worked together before on another rig. There was some team building when 
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the new crew started, but some of the informants expressed a wish for more of these 
activities, including more social activities when the crew is onshore. They say that this would 
be valuable for the social relationship between the colleagues and that this would further 
help build good working routines and efficiency.  
 
4.5 A generational change 
 
All of the informants confirm that there is an open culture on board focused on dialog and 
mutual respect for each other. Everyone can make suggestions. Everyone do also say that 
there is little time pressure and the focus is on doing the operations safe even if it might take 
a bit longer.  Some of the informants talk about an “old generation” and a “new generation” 
in terms of organisational structure and the way of working. The old generation is 
characterised by more hierarchy and less dialog. One person say that this type of generation 
might make it more difficult to ask questions and make suggestions, especially if there is a 
very strong “old generation” leader on top. However on this rig there are a lot of leaders 
emphasising the new generation way and this facilitates the open culture that they have 
here. The new generation way is also supported by the operator company and their 
representatives on board. Less time pressure and more safety focus is also related to this 
change of generation. One of the informants describes it like this: 
 
 
“If we have a problem we fix it and it doesn’t matter if it takes a bit more time as long as 
we do it safe” – Informant C  
 
One of the informants with the longest experience says that when he started working there 
was almost nothing called safety, operation came above everything else. There was not the 
same information flow from well tools either and the driller was virtually blind while drilling 
and could never know for sure what came up. 
 
4.6 Third party companies and foreign workers 
 
Two of the informants work for a third party service company. Both of them say that the rig 
is a very good place to work and they feel that they are included and that they are part of 
one big team. They also describe that this has not always been the case when they’ve been 
working other places in the world. One of them have experienced that people do not 
communicate well enough in other places he’s been and it seems like they don’t care about 
each other as much as here. On this rig people are interested in their work and who they are 
and often ask questions: 
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“We are not anymore the “guys from the cage” “ – Informant H 
 
One informant thinks that the third party service companies, the operator company and the 
contractor are equally important in their respective fields in terms of safety. A couple of the 
other informants emphasise that everyone depends on everyone on the rig and in the end 
they all become one big team.  
 
The service companies, especially mud loggers and data operators have a close dialogue with 
the drillers and the rest of the drilling crew. They communicate on a daily basis through 
radio, telephone or face-to-face. They are also invited to all the pre job meetings held by the 
drilling crew. However they are not that much involved in debrief meetings unless 
something has happened. Even though the service companies have their own internal 
meetings, the OIM and Rig Superintendent have meetings with both the service companies 
and the operator company in order to include them in everything that happens and make 
sure they are informed. This is confirmed by an informant form a service company.  
 
One informant say that they have pre job meetings with the people from the service 
company who owns the equipment they’re about to use. Casing equipment is one example 
of such equipment. In these meetings the people from the service company explain how the 
operation is supposed to be performed, what should be taken into account and what might 
be dangerous.  
 
One of the informant say that people from the service companies might see things from a 
different perspective and therefore discover things that the drilling crew do not see. Third 
party companies are not that much involved in the internal procedures of the contractor. 
The informant thinks that it would be an advantage if they were more involved in order to 
improve the procedures: 
 
“If you do something a hundred times you might get a bit blind and it would be good 
if someone asked why it is done exactly like that and came with suggestions of 
improvement”  - Informant C 
 
He also says that this was not welcome in the old generation, but now days, people are more 
open to suggestions.   
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4.7 Differences between Norwegian sector and International 
 
Several of the informants are talking about the difference between working in Norwegian 
sector and working internationally. Some of the informants have experience from British 
sector, Falkland Islands, Africa and the Black Sea among several other places in the world. All 
the informants talking about these differences mention the difference in culture, both 
related to safety and the overall organisational culture. They say that there is much more 
hierarchy in international sectors while in Norway the organisational structure is more flat. 
They all talk about the openness in the Norwegian way of working. There is an open dialog 
where everybody can say their opinion and questions are encouraged. One informant says 
that he notices that foreign employees on board are not used to this and therefore they ask 
a lot less questions than the Norwegians. One of the informants with international 
experience says that the biggest difference, that he experienced, in terms of safety is use of 
the “red zone”. He says that there exist a red zone in other places as well, but this is not so 
much in use. Two of the informants also mention the big efficiency focus that they 
experienced when working international. When working in Norway they are told that it’s ok 
to use a bit more time to make sure the job is done properly and as safe as possible. 
 
4.8 Learning from successful operations 
 
There are hand-over meetings every day with the corresponding crew. On these meetings 
they try to focus on the things that go well in order to do the job the same way next time. 
The respective sections have separate hand-over meetings.  
There are crew meetings where the potential for accidents and potential for improvement in 
the operation is discussed. The focus is primarily on what went wrong or what can go wrong, 
and they share views on how to do things in another way to make it safer or more effective. 
They have pre job meetings where they discuss how the job shall be done. There are also 
often debriefings after the job is done, especially if they have found a better way to do 
things.  These debriefings are a part of the process of improving the internal work 
procedures.  
The driller and toolpusher makes notes in the drilling instructions during and after the 
operation. This is written into a log which is evaluated by the operator company onshore 
who makes the drilling programs. Both positive and negative things are written. Some of it 
might be included in the next drilling programs in order to improve these.  
 
This could be considered as an example of double loop learning. Instead of learning and 
adjusting the behaviour only locally, the learning is used to adjust more overall goals.  
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At least once during the 14 days shift there is a crew meeting lead by the safety 
representative in the crew. Questions from other crews are discussed and they get an insight 
in what the other crews have been working on.  
All the section leaders have a daily meeting. All the service companies have morning and 
evening meetings with the operator company, logistics, Rig Superintendent and OIM. The 
service companies have internal systems for reporting and experience transfer.  
 
They have a system of “share cards” on the rig. This is a reporting system where you make 
notes on a small card if you see something that you think needs reporting. This information 
is shared with everyone both on the rig and in the rest of the organisation. Nothing is too 
little or too stupid to write down on one of these cards.  
 
There is a system of lessons learned. A lesson learned is a documented incident that is 
reviewed by all the crews. This is discussed on every safety meeting and drilling meeting. It is 
also passed on to the land organisation and from there to the entire fleet. One of the 
informants says that he thinks these lessons learned are very important to share with 
everybody. Everything in a lesson learned is anonymous and he thinks this is a better way of 
learning and preventing the incident from happening again than e.g. the use of warning 
letters to the people involved. Warning letters can make people anxious and sleepless which 
would increase people’s stress levels and thus affect their work performance, cf. WOCRM by 
Flin et al. (2014). 
 
One of the informants believes that the most important arena for learning is to get together 
and discuss in groups. He also says that the most important learning is at the sharp end. In 
relation to this the driller and toolpusher’s daily meeting with the drill crew is very 
important. This is to inform everyone about what is going to happen. It is important that 
everybody have a good understanding of this. He also sees the value of simple and 
straightforward information that cannot be misunderstood.  
One person says that training and good follow-ups are important for experience transfer 
inside the crew. Good ideas for improvement are encouraged.  
One informant says that you learn a lot from trying different things yourself and it is 
important that the supervisor encourage you to try by yourself. People with long experience 
work alongside people with less experience in order to learn.  That means that work and 
procedure are quality assured one might assume. It also allows for sharing of tacit 
knowledge (Polyani, 1967; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Jacobsen & Thorsvik, 2007). This way 
of working do resembles redundancy in HRO. Quality checks of each other’s work are a 
means of creating redundancy (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
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When asked about the potential for improvement of learning arenas, one of the informants 
mention that it would have been good to have some more cooperation between the service 
companies and the rig contractor regarding handovers.  
 
Stories about successful operations 
 
The informants where asked if they knew any stories of successful operations and things that 
had gone particularly well. If there were any such stories that was passed on among the 
crew on the rig or even from other places. One of the informants answered the question like 
this:   
 
“You do not often hear about successful operations. There is much more focus and 
stories about things that go wrong”- Informant B 
 
The other informants do also answer in a similar way. This confirms the thoughts presented 
in the introduction chapter. Accidents and things that went wrong have been in the centre of 
attention, most probably because of their visibility compared to things that go right. 
Accidents investigations, lessons learned and reporting of negative observations have 
manifested itself as the primary source for learning. Learning from accidents has proved to 
be a valuable resource for improving operations and avoiding similar situations. This kind of 
experience transfer should absolutely be benefited from in the future.  
 
One reason there are so few stories about success among colleagues might be related to the 
Norwegian or Scandinavian culture. The law of Jante is a widely used term in Norway and is 
referring to the text by the author Aksel Sandemose (Sandemose 1933) The law of Jante is 
based on a negative attitude and criticism towards individual success. One can ask whether 
this somewhat colours the stories that are told.  
 
 
4.9 Definition of successful operations 
One of the research questions I seek to answer in this thesis is: What are successful 
operations in terms of safety? Below I will present the main findings related to this research 
question.  
When asked about the definition of a successful operation the answers vary a lot, this 
reflects the subjective nature of this question. However there are some common features in 
most of the descriptions.  One of these common features is the absence of accidents or 
injuries to people. Another one is no problems or damage to the equipment. Several do also 
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describe a successful operation as when everything goes according to plans and you’re able 
to do what you intended and deliver the intended product. One says that it is a success 
when everything goes according to plans, even though it might take a bit longer in order to 
do it safe. Two of the informants emphasise that a successful operation can consist of many 
smaller operations and that the big operation can be successful in the end even though 
there are trouble in some of the smaller operations: 
 
“If you make it one by one in a proper way, at the end small successes will 
become a big success. For me it is a success when you have solved all the 
problems in the end” – Informant H 
 
One person says that a successful operation should have some flow. This doesn’t mean that 
it needs to go very fast, but at least there is some flow. However he also says that there can 
be challenges related to such a flow. If you are in a “flow zone” for too long you risk losing 
some of your focus because you enter a sort of comfort zone. He believes that accidents 
often happen in this kind of situation when you have your guards down. In order to prevent 
this from happening and still maintain the flow they try to rotate on the different work 
stations. Table 5 presents some of the informants’ definitions of successful operations. This 
will further be discussed in light of the research questions in chapter 5. 
 
Table 5: Definitions of successful operations as quoted from the informants 
Informant: Definition of a successful operation: 
A “The operation goes well despite the challenges. People are able to 
anticipate things that can happen and they focus on practical solutions 
if difficulties occur” 
B “A successful operation is when there are no injuries, no accidents, 
nothing happens to the equipment, everything goes as planned, even 
though it might take 10 minutes longer”  
C “Successful can be many things; it’s a very broad question. One big 
operation consists of many smaller operations. The big operation can 
be successful in the end even though there is trouble in a few of the 
smaller ones. A successful operation is when: 
- We manage to do what we intended 
- No problems with equipment that leads to down time 
- HSE is looked after 
- Having some flow in the operation. Doesn’t mean that it needs 
to go very fast but at least there is some flow” 
E “Success is when everything goes according to plans and there are no 
incidents with people or equipment. When you manage to do what 
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you’re supposed to and deliver the intended product. No emission, no 
down time, no incidents or accidents”  
G “A successful operation is when everyone can go home in the same 
state as they were when they came out, that’s the most important 
point. It is of course positive if we manage to do the operations we 
planned and stay inside the budget and time frame, and maybe even 
more effective than planned” 
H “Everything is an operation with a success. If you make it one by one in 
a proper way, at the end small successes will become a big success. It 
is a success when you have solved all the problems in the end” 
J “A successful operation is an operation that is well planned and you 
manage to do it according to plans, first of all when it comes to safety” 
 
 
 
Example of a successful operation 
 
The informants provided various examples of successful operations which they had 
participated in. One such example was when they managed to change a valve on the BOP 
when it was down on the sea bed. This was done by using the ROV. Normally this operation 
would require the BOP to be pulled up. By doing this while the BOP was down they saved a 
lot of time and money. The ROV was operated for 17 hours and by using some extra time 
and doing a thorough job they managed to solve the problem in a good way. This particular 
example was mentioned by three of the informants and they all said that this was an 
unusual and quite special job. One of the informants says that he doesn’t think this has been 
done before. Everyone involved agreed on the solution and the cooperation was good. The 
operator company did also express their support in the decision. I have discussed this 
example in the following paragraphs.  
 
Størseth et al (2010) have considered improvisation as an aspect of the adaption process. In 
facing unexpected situations, which often has never occurred before, it is necessary to 
continuously adapt to the new developments. Such situations are rarely described in any 
procedures and it is therefore no clear prescription on how to act. In order to handle the 
situation it may be necessary to use improvisation to some extent.   
 
This seems like quite an extraordinary job. It is not a routine operation and there is probably 
no procedure on how this shall be done. One could say that this is an example of successful 
improvisation. This kind of improvisation will require good knowledge of the equipment and 
operating skills. Improvisation will also require a high degree of confidence, both in yourself 
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and your colleagues (Andresen et al. 2008). The opportunity to improvise will often depend 
on the organisation since the organisation set up the boundaries within the people can act; 
cf. Andresen et al. (2008). In this case the people involved in the operation had support both 
from their own organisation and the operator company. Improvisation is influenced by the 
ability to adjust the operational mode, reallocate resources and use these available 
resources in a flexible manner (Cunha, Cunha & Kamoche 1999). One of the informants said 
that all of the drilling activity was stopped during this operation and they had skilled people 
that were able to perform the job. Instead of immediately pulling up the BOP and do things 
the same way as always they saw new possibilities. This does also reflect central terms in 
resilience thinking, such as adjustment, adaption and flexibility (Hollnagel et al. 2011). 
Størseth et al. (2010) have also described improvisation as a part of the A-A-R adaption 
process.  
 
According to Cunha & Kamoche (1999) there are three main characteristics of an 
organisation which can promote improvisation: 1) the organisation must have an 
experimental culture. This is the type of culture that allows people to try new things and 
experiment, 2) the organisation must have minimal structure, and management and control 
should instead be carried out indirectly through the organisation’s culture and ideology and 
3) the organisation should also have a low procedural memory, which means little 
formalised procedures and prescriptions on how the different work tasks shall be solved. 
There is a possibility that the rig being new in Norway and with a relatively new crew can 
help facilitate improvisation. Several of the informants confirms that the organisational 
culture on board encourage people to try new ways of doing the jobs and to continuously 
build and improve procedures.   
 
Even though an experimental culture can contribute to successful improvisation, it is 
important that the flipside does not lead to a higher risk level for accidents. In allowing 
people to experiment and try out different solutions one has to keep in mind that these 
actions should not automatically lead to accidents if the experimentation or try should fail, 
cf. error tolerance. In the example with the ROV the operation was not of such character 
that it would have led to an accident if the operation had failed. In worst case they would 
have to pull up the BOP in order to change the valve.  
March (1991) has described exploration in organisational learning as when people utilise 
something in order to learn. In light of this theory the valve change on the BOP could be 
considered as exploration of a new possibility.  
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4.10 Contributing factors to successful operations 
 
Up until now I have presented the results from each of the interview topics along with 
analysis and discussion. In this section I will present the findings related to research question 
2: What factors can contribute to successful operations in terms of safety? These findings 
are based on the preceding topics as well as the informants’ direct answers to this question.   
The informants suggested many factors that might contribute to successful operations. Their 
answer seemed to be somewhat coloured by their positions and previous experience, 
however most of the contributing factors where described by several of the informants. 
When analysing the interview transcriptions 27 contributing factors were identified, these 
are presented in table 6. The informants were asked to mention some factors that they 
thought could contribute to successful operations. In addition some of the factors were 
identified from the answers to other questions in the interview.  
 
Table 6: Contributing factors to successful operations identified from the interviews 
1. Having a plan B   15. Experience, both from previous 
situations and from your colleagues 
2. Plan and think ahead and anticipate 
what might happen  
16. Training and building competence  
3. Thorough planning  17. Right people on the right place  
4. Good procedures  18. Give people meaningful responsibilities   
5. Good reporting  19. Support from the operator company   
6. Good understanding and knowledge 
about the operation, work and rig  
20. Flat organisational structure   
7. Understanding the bigger picture  21. Good culture among everyone with 
mutual respect, transparency and dialog  
8. Correct equipment   22. Good communication and cooperation  
9. Daily maintenance of equipment  23. Working as a team and working for a 
common goal  
10. Being practical and focus on 
solutions  
24. Trust your colleagues and the quality of 
their work  
11. Evaluation of the job, both before 
and after  
25. Good working environment  
12. Little time pressure: focus on 
performing the operation properly 
and safe even though it might take 
some more time  
26. Working with the same crew and people 
you know help build good routines  
13. Everyone can provide input, make 
suggestions and ask questions  
27. Meet on the free time  
 
14. Involve everyone, form the newest 
and youngest to the most 
experienced  
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4.10.1 Analysis and discussion of the contributing factors 
 
The 27 contributing factors that were identified can be grouped into categories. Table 7 
presents five categories with their respective factors. The five categories are inspired by the 
Pentagon model by Schiefloe. This model has been used as a tool for cause analysis in 
accident investigations; however it should also be possible to use such a model when 
studying things that go well (Schiefloe, 2013). Some of the factors belong in more than one 
group as they can be looked at from different perspectives. In the following sections each of 
the factors are discussed.  
 
Table 7: Contributing factors to successful operations grouped in five main categories 
Culture and 
working 
environment 
Interactions: 
Communication, 
cooperation and 
leadership 
Social relations 
and networks- 
Human factors 
and skills 
Formal 
structure and 
organisational 
factors 
Technological 
factors 
13. Everyone 
can provide 
input, make 
suggestions and 
ask questions 
18. Give people 
meaningful 
responsibilities   
6. Good 
understanding 
and knowledge 
about the 
operation, work 
and rig 
1.Having a plan 
B 
8. Correct 
equipment   
21. Good 
culture among 
everyone with 
mutual respect, 
transparency 
and dialog 
22. Good 
communication 
and cooperation 
7.Understanding 
the bigger 
picture 
2. Plan and 
think ahead and 
anticipate what 
might happen 
9. Daily 
maintenance of 
equipment 
25. Good 
working 
environment 
23. Working as a 
team and 
working for a 
common goal 
10. Being 
practical and 
focus on 
solutions 
3. Thorough 
planning 
 
  13. Everyone 
can provide 
input, make 
suggestions and 
ask questions 
4. Good 
procedures 
 
  14. Involve 
everyone, form 
the newest and 
youngest to the 
most 
experienced 
5. Good 
reporting 
 
  15. Experience, 11. Evaluation  
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both from 
previous 
situations and 
from your 
colleagues 
of the job, both 
before and after 
  23. Working as a 
team and 
working for a 
common goal 
12. Little time 
pressure: focus 
on performing 
the operation 
properly and 
safe even 
though it might 
take some more 
time 
 
  24. Trust your 
colleagues and 
the quality of 
their work 
16. Training and 
building 
competence 
 
  26. Working 
with the same 
crew and people 
you know help 
build good 
routines 
17. Right people 
on the right 
place 
 
  27. Meet on the 
free time on 
shore 
18. Give people 
meaningful 
responsibilities   
 
   19. Support 
from the 
operator 
company   
 
   20. Flat 
organisational 
structure   
 
 
4.10.1.1 Culture and working environment  
 
(13) Everyone can provide input, make suggestions and ask questions 
 
In an environment where everyone can provide input, no matter how little, there might be 
easier to convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Good dialog and involvement can 
help individuals share their tacit knowledge. Encouraging questions can also help reveal 
some of this knowledge. As described by Jacobsen & Thorsvik (2007) individuals do often 
lack awareness of the knowledge they utilise and questions from colleagues might make 
48 
 
them reflect more on this and find the right words to describe it. An environment where 
everyone can provide input resembles HRO, e.g. in the aviation industry, where a co-pilot 
can give suggestions to the captain and even correct his actions (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). 
 
(21) Good culture among everyone with mutual respect, openness and dialog 
Respect for each other’s field of expertise and work responsibilities is important to maintain 
a good dialog and teamwork. It seems like the crew on board this rig have acknowledged 
that everyone has an equally important role and that everyone’s work are equally important 
to achieve a successful operation, both in the terms of safety and efficiency.  
 
(25) Good working environment  
 
A couple of the informants spoke of the shift scheme where they work one week on a 
daytime shift and one week on a night time shift. This scheme implies a very abrupt 
transition which they thought had a negative effect on people. As one of the informants 
pointed out, most people’s bodies need time to adjust to this transition. Little sleep and 
fatigue can be considered a performance shaping factor as described by Flin et al. (2014). 
One can argue that enough sleep and being well rested help people stay focused, increasing 
their level of attention and thereby decreasing the number of mistakes. Good working 
conditions might also make people more receptive to learning. Everyone should feel 
responsible for creating a good working environment both for themselves and for their 
colleagues.   
 
4.10.1.2 Interactions: Communication, cooperation and leadership 
 
 
 (18) Give people meaningful responsibilities   
This is related to leadership. Allowing people to work with something they feel good at and 
to make full use of their skills can be a motivational factor. This also goes for having 
meaningful responsibilities. One of the informants said that his supervisor was very good at 
giving him responsibilities and allowing him to try for himself. The supervisor was always 
there to support and guide him, but he did not “take the work out of his hands” as he 
described it. Meaningful responsibilities will make people feel appreciated and perhaps they 
will focus more on the safety aspects of their responsibilities as well.  
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(22) Good communication and cooperation and (23) Working as a team and working for a 
common goal 
Working as a team is one type of cooperation, therefore (22) and (23) are discussed in the 
same paragraph. Both teamwork and cooperation are two of the CRM skills described 
studied by Flin et al. (2014). Well-functioning communication and cooperation seems to be 
crucial for successful operations. One of the informants emphasise that the communication 
should be clear and easily understood without any room for ambiguity. The fact that there is 
a relatively flat organisational structure on board that facilitates close dialog will make a 
good foundation for communication and good cooperation across disciplines. There are no 
A-team and B-team and the focus is on involvement. Working for a common goal which is in 
everyone’s best interest can make people feel stronger relations to their colleagues and this 
will perhaps further enhance communication and cooperation. As described by Schiefloe 
(2013) interaction is a precondition for social relations and network, and a foundation for 
organisational culture, learning and experience transfer.  
 
4.10.1.3 Social relations and networks- Human factors and skills 
 
(6) Good understanding and knowledge about the operation, work and rig 
 
The understanding and knowledge about the operation, work and rig constitutes a 
foundation for several of the other factors. This is particularly important in order to see the 
bigger picture and when making plans. One of the informants said that everyone should 
have an understanding of the upcoming operation, how it is planned and what challenges 
they might encounter. It will also be important that people are motivated and self-confident 
enough to use their knowledge and competence.   
     
 
(7) Understanding the bigger picture  
 
We focus on the big picture as well as the little things. On Deepwater Horizon 
they might have focused too much on only the small things. I believe they 
celebrated 7 years without any LTI on the same day as the accident.                    
- Informant F 
 
 
Understanding the bigger picture is about mindfulness. According to Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007) mindfulness can be explained as the ability to see the bigger picture. The ability to 
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see the bigger picture could be central in the process of a successful operation. Today’s 
complex systems consist of many activities, components and conditions which are 
dependent and interact with each other all the time. In order for the operations to go well it 
is required good knowledge of these interactions and one must therefore always have the 
big picture in mind. Mindfulness also represents the concept of resilience in the way that 
resilience seeks to anticipate future situations and monitor ongoing developments to always 
be prepared for what’s next.  On the other hand, it will probably be impossible to be aware 
of all the possible interactions and combinations all of the time.  In situations where one 
have not been able to foresee certain interactions and unexpected situations occur, the 
ability to respond becomes important. Unforeseen interactions and unexpected 
developments do not necessary lead to an accident; it could just as well have no negative 
consequence at all. It is important to have the ability to determine if unexpected 
developments are a warning sign or not. This is all about knowing how and when to respond.  
 
The ability to understand the bigger picture might also be a motivational factor. One might 
be more motivated and feel a different ownership towards the job if you feel that what you 
do is an important contribution to a bigger product.  
 
(10) Being practical and focus on solutions 
 
“If you have a problem, do not create another problem. Solve the first 
problem before you go on”- Informant J 
 
These are some wise words from one of the informants. Being practical and focus on 
solutions are central features when facing challenges and especially new and perhaps 
unknown challenges. Dealing with one problem at a time, if possible, can prevent the 
situation from becoming more complex, thus it will be easier to foresee interactions and 
keep track of the bigger picture.  
 
Several of the informants emphasised that if a challenge or problem occurred the operation 
could be stopped and everyone involved got together and discussed possible solutions. This 
kind of collective brainstorming seems to be very helpful for the crew.  Not only do they 
more easily solve the problem, they do also facilitate the opportunity to learn from 
colleagues and their ideas. This can help increase the overall level of knowledge in the crew.   
 
(13) Everyone can provide input, make suggestions and ask questions 
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This bears witness of the good and informal relations among the crew. Schiefloe (2013) has 
described sharing of knowledge and experience as a key word for Social relations and 
network. This was further elaborated in section 4.10.1.1.  
 
(14) Involve everyone, form the newest and youngest to the most experienced 
 
One of the informants is particularly concerned with the involvement of the newest and the 
youngest. He says that they can often see things that the more experienced do not notice. 
This could be things that the more experienced do not reflect upon simply because they’re 
so used to it, even though it might have a big potential for improvement. One informant did 
also talk about the dangers related to very frequent routine operations and the flow that 
comes with such operations. If you have done the operation a hundred times you might 
become a bit “blind” and a new pair of eyes can therefore be most helpful.   
To involve the newest and the least experienced on board are also important for learning 
and the building of competence. This is an example of exploitation, cf. March 1991), in the 
sense that knowledge is transferred from the more experienced two the less experienced.  
 
(15) Experience, both from previous situations and from your colleagues 
 
In several of the interviews experience and skilled people came up as a prerequisite for 
success. Experience from previous operations and with the equipment will probably increase 
the ability to catch early warning signals and to find solutions, cf. the ability to respond and 
monitor in Resilience (Hollnagel et al 2011). Rosness et al (2008) do also argue that a high 
level of competence and experience may increase the operator’s ability to detect unwanted 
and unforeseen developments at an early stage.  
 
The informants described a core of very experienced leaders on board. These leaders can be 
a very good resource for experience transfer and learning for the people with less 
experience. It was described by the informants that everyone’s opinion were equally 
respected regardless of experience. All the knowledge, both silent and explicit, and 
experience of the crew on board can be considered one large experience database. It is 
important to have mutual respect for each other’s competence, to see the value of your 
colleagues’ experience and to use this as a resource in planning, decision making and 
problem solving.   
 
(23) Working as a team and working for a common goal 
 
This factor was elaborated in section 4.10.1.2  
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 (24) Trust your colleagues and the quality of their work 
One of the informants described a situation where the driller would choose to stop the 
operation because he did not feel that everything was ok. Even though there was no 
indication of anything wrong the company man and the senior toolpusher would respect and 
support the driller’s decision. The operation would be stopped and they would check for 
problems. Even though sometimes it turned out that everything was in fact fine, the others 
would never criticise the driller’s decision. This does again illustrate the “better safe than 
sorry” policy on board.  
 
(26) Working with the same crew and people you know help build good routines and (27) 
Meet on the free time  
Several of the informants said that working with the same crew and people you know was a 
great enrichment for the operations and work itself. Working in a fixed crew helps build 
good working routines and create an effective team. It will also be directly linked to a good 
working environment where people trust each other and feel confident in their roles.  
One of the informants expressed a wish for more social events on the free time on shore. He 
felt that such events or team building would further facilitate good and efficient working 
routines. Team building can also help develop social relations that might contribute to a 
greater sense of responsibility for your colleagues. People caring about each other and 
looking out for each other might improve the level of safety. Skjerve (2008) has described 
robust work practice as e.g. when a person notify a colleague who is about to do something 
wrong, that can lead to negative consequences for him or others. It requires good, well 
established relations and trust to be able to tell a colleague that he or she has made, or is 
about to make a safety critical error.  One must be able to trust each other and do not take 
offense when someone point out an error or mistake.  
 
4.10.1.4 Formal structure and organisational factors 
 
(1) Having a plan B (2) Thorough planning (3) Plan and think ahead and anticipate what 
might happen 
 
Thinking ahead and anticipate what might happen is one of the four pillars of a resilient 
system, the potential (Hollnagel et al., 2011). This could also be recognised from Schiefloe’s 
five prerequisites for safe operation which describes a reliable organisation as one that make 
use of good planning and risk assessment (Schiefloe, 2012). Størseth et al. (2010) have 
described risk awareness as one of the Contributing Success Factors(CSF’s). This includes the 
adaption process in resilience engineering: Anticipation-Attention-Response(A-A-R). 
Planning and anticipation of future events have a central role in this process.  
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It is reasonable to believe that the range and variety of the potential events one will be able 
to anticipate are related to previous experience and knowledge and so will the sensemaking 
should such an event occur. Clegg et al. (2008) have described seven characteristics of the 
sensemaking processes; one of these characteristics tells us that the processes are 
retrospective in the way that people make sense of things by interpreting present situations 
in the light of the past. However it is important to “look outside of the box”, and not rely 
solely on own experience. A broad specter of knowledge and experienced people will help 
improve planning and anticipation. 
  
A plan B will be a result of some kind of risk assessment, job evaluation or anticipation 
process. This would be a way of ensuring that the crew knows how to respond if 
irregularities occur cf. the four pillars of Resilience (Hollnagel et al 2011). A plan B can be 
prepared on different levels. It could be specified as part of the original plans, but it can also 
be less specific actions that are based more on the ability to be flexible, adapt and improvise. 
 
Some of the informants talk about thorough planning as an important factor for success. 
Here one can draw parallels to the Efficiency-Thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) as described by 
Hollnagel (2013a). According to the ETTO principle there must be a minimum level of both 
efficiency and thoroughness in order to succeed with an operation, however it will be 
impossible to maximise both at the same time (Hollnagel 2013a). It seems like the 
organisation on board this rig has found a well-functioning balance between efficiency and 
thoroughness. They continuously work to improve efficiency, but never at the expense of 
safety. One might get the sensation that this is an organisation that favours thoroughness 
above efficiency pressure.   
 
(4) Good procedures  
 
Procedures are important not only as a means of fulfilling laws and regulations, but also as a 
fundament creating a certain common standard in all the operations. A well-functioning 
structural fundament can be important to have success. One of the informants point out 
that not all the procedures are as easy to follow in practise. He believes these procedures 
are often written by people on shore who do not have the adequate knowledge about how 
the work is actually done. A good procedure should have a professional foundation, serve 
the purpose and be pedagogically good. It is essential that the user can understand the value 
of the procedure and why procedures are needed. One way to obtain this can be to make 
people feel ownership towards the procedures. On this rig the culture is characterised by 
openness and involvement and everyone can make suggestions. This might help facilitate 
people’s involvement in the writing and editing of procedures. Even though it might be 
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crucial with a structural fundament of procedures, one must keep in mind that too rigid 
procedures might leave little room for adaption and flexibility.  
 
Reading of procedures is not a part of everyone’s work on board, it seems like the 
procedures are often transferred orally to the user:  
 
I do not often read specific procedures, but my supervisor informs us of what is 
allowed and not allowed and how the job should be performed. – Informant A 
 
From what the informants have told it seems like procedures and regulations are taken 
seriously by everyone on board 
 
 
(5) Good Reporting 
 
Reporting of not only unwanted, but also wanted incidents can contribute to learning from 
things that go well. In order for people to appreciate the opportunity of reporting it is 
important to give response and to discuss the reported incidents. Good reporting is not only 
about having a high number of reports, but to also have good quality (Kjellén, 2000). It might 
seem like the focus on board is on reporting of unwanted incidents: 
 
“My most important contribution is to tell people if I see something that is, or 
might become dangerous” – Informant A 
 
“I report when something happens that can lead to a bigger problem”                      
– Informant F 
 
 (11) Evaluation of the job, both before and after 
 
Evaluation before the job starts would be a part of planning and risk assessment. Pre-job 
meetings and pre- job evaluations are rather common and often embodied in procedures. 
Debrief or evaluation after the job is perhaps more uncommon. One of the informants says 
that they do have debrief meetings on board the rig, but this does rarely involve everyone 
that contributed to the job. Another informant says that debriefs are most common after 
operations where something did not go according to plan. More focus on debriefs also after 
successful operations might contribute to learning from things that go well. Resilience tells 
us to make use of learning not only from previous accidents and failures, but also to draw 
knowledge from success and normal operations (Hollnagel et al 2011). 
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(12) Little time pressure: focus on performing the operation properly and safe even though 
it might take some more time 
 
The overall impression is that there is little time pressure or pressure related to increasing 
efficiency on this rig. According to the informants this also applies for the rest of the 
Norwegian sector. This does not mean that they don’t focus on improving efficiency, they do 
always have this in mind and are continuously working on finding new and more efficient 
ways to perform the operations and avoid down time. However the main focus seems to be 
on performing efficient, high quality operations without compromising the level of safety. 
Several of the informants did also emphasise that this trade-off was supported by both the 
land organisation and the operator company. According to Rasmussen’s model of drift both 
management efficiency pressure and the effort to avoid unacceptable work load can steer 
the operation towards the boundary of acceptable risk (Rasmussen 1997). Being able to 
minimise this pressure to an acceptable level can therefore be essential for safe work. What 
the acceptable level of pressure is will most likely vary between different operations. It will 
probably be more acceptable to try optimising the efficiency in routine operations than in 
more challenging and less frequent operations or critical phases. Flin et al (2014) have 
described stress as one of the performance shaping factors, the low time pressure on board 
contributes to a low stress level and can therefore increase the level of high quality work 
performances.  
 
 
Some of the informants describe the culture on board as opposite of a “Texas culture”, 
meaning little focus on safety, favouring efficiency above thoroughness and a stressful work 
environment. This seems to be more the way of working in the international sectors where 
these informants have been. Some, especially the ones with long experience do confirm that 
this was also the situation in Norway in the earlier days of the offshore industry.  
 
 
(16) Training and building competence 
 
Training and building competence are directly linked to experience. One of the informants 
point out that it is important that everyone learn how things are done and how the 
procedures are to be followed, and that everyone get the same prerequisites for learning. 
He emphasise that 1:1 training can impair the quality of the competence. If number one 
teaches number two, number two teaches number three and so on, you risk that number 
nine in the row might be “lazy” and only pass on the shortcuts to number ten. 
Several of the informants said that Norwegian offshore employees represent an overall high 
standard in competence. The professional status are raised through formalised education 
and training of good quality.  
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A high level of competence, skills and knowledge will make the operator more prepared to 
handle unwanted and unforeseen situations. Competence and experience might help 
compensate in situations where there is no procedure or clearly defined prescription on how 
to act (Rosness et al 2008).  
 
(17)  Right people on the right place and   
To have the right people working on the right place could be just as important as using the 
correct equipment. Allowing people to work with something they feel good at and to make 
full use of their skills can be a motivational factor. This is also an aspect of planning and 
resource management. In the example of the valve change on the BOP that was presented in 
chapter 4.9 they had very skilled ROV operators on board that had the confident to carry out 
the operation.  
 
(19) Support from the operator company   
As a contractor company the operator will be your client. The operator company makes the 
drilling program and will often be on top of the decision making. It is therefore very 
important for the contractor and the crew on board that they have support from the 
operator, especially the company man who is the operator company’s main representative 
on board. The informants say that the operator company support the favouring of little time 
pressure and high focus on performing safe operations above efficiency pressure.  One of 
the informants emphasised that the company man was part of the great team and there was 
no “them” and “we”.  
Woods and Wreathall (2003) described sacrifice judgements. This could be when you choose 
to sacrifice production above safety. In order for the decision-maker to know when to stop 
or reduce the production, there need to be some guidelines or in other words decision 
support. Support from the operator company could help make these decisions easier when 
you know the client approve. Disapproval from the client would have made the threshold for 
stopping the operation much higher.  
 
(20) Flat organisational structure   
A flat organisational structure implies that decisions are made on the lowest possible level of 
the organisation, as near the sharp end as possible. Proximity to the operation will be an 
advantage. As pointed out by one of the informants, procedures and work routines are often 
written by people on shore who does not have a full understanding of the operation in 
question. This can make it difficult to follow the procedures. Flat organisational structure 
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does also imply short communication routes and it is therefore less likely that messages are 
misunderstood. It seems like the leaders are good at delegate decision making without 
pulverising of the responsibility. Such an organisational structure will make it easier to build 
relations across different levels and it could thus be easier to give a heads up or to make new 
suggestions.  
 
4.10.1.5 Technological factors 
 
(8) Correct equipment (9) Daily maintenance of equipment  
 
The use of correct equipment can be linked to the planning phase of an operation. One of 
the informants pointed out that they always tried to prepare all the equipment they needed 
before the operation started and it was important that they knew exactly where to find the 
equipment needed. Maintenance of equipment can be seen as an act of proactivity. 
Maintenance and testing of e.g. the BOP are performed to prepare for potential unwanted 
events. The bigger picture does also play a role in maintenance of equipment: 
 
“It’s important to keep the details in mind as well, but we often see that it’s 
the basics that’s lacking. Like basic maintenance and such” – Informant F 
 
Technical aspects did not come up as a very significant topic in the interviews. However it 
was briefly spoken of in relation to some of the other topics.   
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5 Summarising discussion 
 
In chapter 4 I presented the main findings from the empirical study, including the 
informants’ definitions of successful operations and the 27 factors that might contribute to 
success. In this chapter I will discuss these findings in relation to my research questions and 
in the end reach a conclusion which is presented in chapter 6.  
What are successful operations in terms of safety? 
To define successful operations can prove to be quite challenging. First of all people might 
disagree on whether a successful operation is the same as a normal operation, or if a 
successful operation is something that goes exceptionally well against all odds. I have earlier 
pointed at the very visible nature of accidents and failure. When operations go well people 
rarely reflect upon why or pay any extra attention to this. In most cases people probably do 
not know if their work could have led to an accident under a minor change of circumstances, 
as long as there are no such signals and the operation go well. One can therefore raise the 
question: Is it a successful operation even though we are just seconds or “inches” away from 
having an accident instead? Many would probably say that everything that does not go 
wrong can be defined as a successful operation because in most cases we do not know that 
we are “inches from the cliff”. Others again would argue that in order to have a successful 
operation we must know for sure that we are on safe ground, and on safe distance from an 
accident. This could probably be discussed in the infinite and therefore I chose to consider 
only the findings in the interviews when trying to answer this question.  
7 of the 10 informants presented what they meant were characteristics of a successful 
operation. These are highly subjective opinions, even so they all have something in common. 
It seems like the focus is on the outcome of the operation, rather than the operation itself. 
This could be because the word success is associated with a result, just like failure on the 
opposite side. The operation do not necessarily need to be perfect from start to end, there 
might be some challenges, but as long as these challenges are dealt with in a good way the 
result is a success. 
  
Plans seem to be central to the characterization of a successful operation. Several of the 
informants think that the operation is a success if it goes according to plans and intentions 
determined in advance. It seems like “everything going according to plans” do not necessary 
include financial plans and time budgets. All of the informants agree that the operation can 
be a success and go according to plans even though it might take some more time to do it 
safe and properly. However in the example with the ROV operation on the BOP, the 
informants focused on the saving of time and cost as a way of describing why it was 
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particularly successful. This is probably because repairing and maintaining the BOP is 
considered a very expensive affair.   
 
Another central aspect of a successful operation is when the safety is maintained and no 
people are injured. The life and health of people should be the first priority when it comes to 
maintaining safety, followed by damages to the environment and damages to equipment.  
 
What factors can contribute to successful operations in terms of safety? 
In chapter 4 I presented 27 factors that were identified in the empirical study. These are 
factors that might contribute to successful operations in terms of safety. Figure 10 illustrates 
these factors divided in to the five groups inspired by the Pentagon model (Schiefloe, 2013). 
Three of the groups can be characterized as informal factors. These factors are related to 
humans and how they interact. Two groups consist of more formal factors such as 
technology and factors related to the organisation. There is not necessarily always a clear 
distinction between formal and informal factors; some might belong in both categories. 
Formal factors might also be a prerequisite for informal factors and the other way around.  
Some of the groups in the figure are bigger than others to illustrate the distribution of 
factors among the five groups. The group of “technology” is the smallest. However this does 
not necessarily imply that technological factors are less important than others. It seems like 
the informants had a greater focus towards the other four groups. This could of course be 
due to the nature of the questions or the subconscious focus of the interviewers.  
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Figure 10: Factors that might contribute to successful operations in terms of safety 
The results from this study imply that both formal and informal factors are necessary to 
achieve success. Resilience engineering and HRO tend to focus on factors such as adaption 
to the situation and flexibility through more informal factors.  From table 7 one can see that 
the informants are equally concerned with both formal and informal factors. The factors 
identified in this study are also perhaps not so much based on the properties of HRO and 
Resilience as first assumed. That said, HRO and Resilience are not only about informal 
qualities and many of both the informal and formal factors could be recognised from these 
theoretical perspectives. However, these results raise the question of why the informants 
tend to focus so much on the formal. It can seem like the informants are more oriented 
towards compliance and Paradigm 1 than resilience and Paradigm 2 (Hale & Borys, 2011). 
Some of them emphasise that the legislation and regulations in Norway are a lot stricter 
than it was in the Gulf of Mexico on the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident. They also 
say that good procedures, reporting and following routines are important to avoid major 
accidents. Despite this I think it would be wrong to place the organisation and people on 
board in one of the two categories. They do not completely match the criterions for either 
one of the paradigms. The informants describe a flat organisational structure and a type of 
leadership that is not consistent with the top-down approach in Paradigm 1. This might 
imply that both compliance and resilience are equally important for successful operations 
and that a certain degree of both are required. 
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The purpose of studying the factors that might contribute to successful operations is use the 
knowledge to learn in order to create further success. Learning in itself will be one factor 
that can contribute to success. Some of the factors identified in this study will help facilitate 
learning. A flat organisation with openness, involvement, good communication and little 
hierarchy, will create a good learning platform. Involvement of everyone will make sure that 
even though you’re not always the one providing input you will always have the opportunity 
to learn.  
 
Recommendations for further work 
The number of informants was limited by time and availability; however the number of ten 
informants seemed to provide a degree of empirical saturation serving the purpose of this 
study. One can of course agree that more informants and an even wider range of positions 
would have strengthened the results of the study.  
 
The interview guide was developed by very experienced researchers, and it is therefore 
unlikely that the interview guide would be of better quality if I had developed it by myself. 
That said, it is possible that the interview guide could have been even more specific in 
relation to my research questions, however this would perhaps prevented me from 
discovering related interfaces and topics. 
 
For further work it would be interesting to study more cases similar to this one. It would be 
interesting to see if there are similar interpretations and opinions among crews in other 
companies operating in Norway. This study comprises a relatively small number of 
informants with a predominance of people from the contractor company. In order to gain a 
wider understanding of the topic more interviews should be conducted. Successful 
operations is a very positively charged topic and people will most likely be open and honest, 
however observations of the operations on a drilling rig would also provide another 
dimension to the study. It can be difficult to fully understand the complexity of the work only 
through word-based information. To conduct observations on the rig would also allow a 
closer dialog with the informants. As described in the methodology chapter all the 
interviews were conducted by   telephone. Face-to-face interviews would maybe create a 
better interaction between the interviewer and the informant and you would also be able to 
observe the informants reactions and body language. The interviews in this study were of a 
semi-structured nature that was carried out partially as an open conversation. It would be 
interesting to conduct group interviews of the same structure allowing colleagues to discuss 
the topics. 
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This study focused on drilling operations in the oil and gas industry. However it would be 
interesting to conduct a similar study in other areas such as the construction industry to see 
if there might be some common characteristics of successful operations in terms of safety.  
 
The research project “Learning from Successful Operations” seeks to develop methods and 
tools that can be used to analyse and learn from successful operations. I will now present 
some opinions on the subject. Experience transfer from things that go well can take place in 
two dimensions, internally in the organisation and externally between organisations. Every 
minute spent on investigation and analysis of accidents costs money, this will also apply for 
analysis of successful operation. I think it would be wise to make use of already existing 
arenas for experience transfer as much as possible. Because of time and cost it will be easy 
to choose not to spend time on analysis of things that go well. It will therefore be important 
that such methods and tools become an integrated part of the organisation’s strategy. It will 
most likely be impossible to look at every successful operation since they constitutes the 
majority of all operations, however the organisation can choose some key areas which they 
find particularly interesting to learn from. When considering the other dimension, the 
experience transfer between organisations, it might also be a good idea to use well 
established arenas. One might also consider if there should level of commitment to learning 
from successful operations, e.g. through the Petroleum Safety Authority (Ptil) or Norwegian 
Industrial Safety Organisation (NSO). As mentioned earlier this is no definite answer to how 
the methods and tools should be, it is merely a few recommendations.   
 
 
 
  
63 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The objective for this thesis was successful operations in terms of safety. The main goal was 
to study what characterises such operations and what factors might contribute to success. 
The results from the empirical study were analysed and discussed in light of the theory. In 
this chapter an answer to each of the research questions are presented.   
What are successful operations in terms of safety? 
 
It can be difficult to reach a clear definition of successful operations. The definition will 
probably vary depending on who you ask and what areas their occupied with. This was 
confirmed by the informant’s answers in the interviews. However there seems to be some 
common features of a successful operation that they all agree on. The safety of people is the 
main priority. If the life and health of people are maintained the operation is successful in 
terms of safety. In a successful operation one should also achieve the intended result, even 
though it might take a bit longer than planned. An operation is successful in terms of safety 
if everyone on board can return home in the same state as they were when they came out to 
work and the goal of the operation is achieved. It will be a bonus if the operation stays inside 
of the budget and time frame and maybe even more effective than planned. 
 
What factors can contribute to successful operations in terms of safety? 
27 factors that might contribute to successful operations in terms of safety have been 
identified in this study. These factors can be grouped into: 1) Culture and working 
environment, 2) Interactions: Communication, cooperation and leadership, 3) Social 
relations and networks- Human factors and skills, 4) Formal structure and organisational 
factors and 5) Technological factors. The majority of these factors belonged to the group 
Social relations and networks- Human factors and skills and Formal structure and 
organisational factors. The theory mainly focuses on informal factors related to humans and 
their actions; despite this, the empirical findings in this study do clearly indicate that both 
formal qualities and informal qualities must be present in order to create successful 
operations. Due to the complexity in drilling operations it might be difficult to explain exactly 
what is causing it to go so well. It can be hard to pin point because people might not know 
the exact reasons. Things that go well have not been the focus of traditional safety thinking, 
and people and organisations are not used to reflect upon the causes behind success.  Just 
like accidents are rarely caused by only one reason alone, successful operations is the result 
of multiple conditions and factors.    
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Recommendations for further work  
 
In this study 27 factors were identified as possible contributions to successful operations. 
However this study can be characterised as merely a pilot study. Further studies are required 
to confirm if these factors are the ones that really create the foundation for a successful 
operation. Such further studies should also include observation of the operations in addition 
to interviews. One should also study several different drilling rigs and their operations in 
order to increase the validity of the results.   
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A – Interview guide  
 Introduction 
First of all we would like to thank you for your time. We are a research group with an 
interest in the oil and gas industry and with many years of experience of the industry. We 
have in particular worked on understanding and preventing major accidents. Since we have 
worked with learning and improvement within the industry, we have seen a need to look not 
just at the accidents and undesired events etc., but also to learn from successful operations. 
That is to learn from things that go well.  
In this project we are interested in talking with you on the topic of successful operations and 
we are interested in your points of view and experiences. We therefore ask to conduct 
interviews with relevant individuals, although interviews in groups can also be of interest. 
The interviews will last maximum 1,5 hours.  
All participation in this project is voluntary. Information about people (name, occupation, 
education and vocational experiences) will be kept confidential and reporting will be 
anonymous. So no link to the people who are interviewed will be made. Only the research 
group will have access to that data.  
The project is financed by the Norwegian Research Council, and part of the Petromaks 
programme.  
We have an interview guide with questions. However, the intention of the interview is to 
have a conversation and get your thoughts, opinions and experiences with regards to 
successful operations. All participation is voluntarily. If you should regret participation you 
can withdraw from the interview at any moment.   
We want to use a tape recorder during the interview. The purpose is to record the interview 
as accurately as possible. Only the research group will have access to the raw material. The 
recordings will be stored in office facilities with access control and kept locked. All data will 
be deleted after the project is over. 
Is it ok for you that we use a tape recorder? 
Do you have any questions before we start?  
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1 The informant’s job 
- What is your background (Experiences, education, course)  
- What is your main responsibility?  
- Who are important persons you co-operate with in order to perform your job?  
 
2 Can you explain why the rig has not experienced a major accident like 
Deepwater Horizon or similar accident?   
2.1 What is your contribution to the rig to avoid a major accident? 
 
3 Identification of successful operations (Examples) 
Can you provide an example of an operation where safety and prevention of a major 
accident was ensured?  
 
4 Assessment of success of operations 
- Make use of the example. What are the reasons that would you say that the safety 
was well taken care of?    
 
4.1 How is it possible to know that the risk for major accident is well taken care of in 
the middle of a critical phase in the operation?   
 
4.2 How is it possible to know afterwards (in retrospect) that the risk of major 
accidents was well taken care of (Maintained)?  
 
4.3 Are there stories told in your organisation with regards to successful operations or 
successful recovery?  
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5 Explaining success  
 
5.1 Are there particular conditions/circumstances/plans/procedures that ensured that 
you did not end up in a hazardous situation?  
- This might also involve planning and risk assessment beforehand, involvement in the 
planning etc.  
5.2 Were there phases in the operation, which required you to be constantly prepared 
for surprises? Why did it work so well? What resources could you use/call upon?  
- This includes situations faced with a weak and ambiguous danger signals, i.e. small 
increases in mud volume. The interaction between the land organizations is also of interest.   
 
5.3 Did critical situations occur? How did you regain control? What resources did you 
use?  
 
5.4 Did situations occur when things went well due to pure luck (”griseflaks”)? Did you 
do anything to assist the luck?  
 
Catchword/ guide words if the informant need some time/assist:  
- Ability to anticipate the problems that may occur (different time horizons) 
- Preparation for the unexpected 
- Resources to deal with the unexpected 
- Backup-behaviour (double anticipation, two pair of eyes seeing the same 
phenomena, looking at data and response and preparation in order to unload/relieve), 
organizational redundancy, authority gradient.  
- Experiences as a resource 
- Interaction with the land organization 
- Handling of conflicting goals (decision dilemmas) 
- Ability to improvise 
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- Ability to co-ordinate 
- Overview and control with (well) barriers.  
- Intuition, ”bad feeling, unease” (This might be a form of pattern recognition) 
 
Alternative follow-up topics: 
1. Knowing what to do, that is, how to respond to regular and irregular disruptions and 
disturbances either by implementing a prepared set of responses or by adjusting normal 
functioning. This is the ability to address the actual. 
2. Knowing what to look for, that is, how to monitor that which is or can become a threat in 
the near term. The monitoring must cover both that which happens in the environment and 
that which happens in the system itself, that is, its own performance. This is the ability to 
address the critical. 
3. Knowing what to expect, that is, how to anticipate developments, threats, and 
opportunities further into the future, such as potential changes, disruptions, pressures, and 
their consequences. This is the ability to address the potential. 
4. Knowing what has happened, that is, how to learn from experience, in particular how to 
learn the right lessons from the right experience—successes as well as failures. This is the 
ability to address the factual. 
 
 
6 Learning from success 
6.1 Are there arenas where you assess how well the control for major accidents (i.e. 
safety with regard to major accidents) was taken care of? Are there tools/methods/aids/ 
routines that pick up that things go well and the reason why?  
(Debrief, handover-meetings, preparation offshore meetings, “End of Well Report”) 
   (Follow up with ”how” questions) 
 
6.2 Is there anyone asking for information on successful operations with regard to what 
worked well?  
- Are experiences from successful operations used with regards to training? 
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- Are there examples where such experiences are implemented in work descriptions/ 
procedures/ steering documentation?  
 
6.3 Are there examples of positive experiences communicated to other shifts/crew or 
other parts of the organization (e.g. the land organisation) or to other organisations?  
- "Lessons to be learned"  
- "One-pagers" etc.?  
- Expert centras?  
- Other? 
 
6.4 Are positive experiences (That is barriers that worked well) picked up in incident 
investigations?  
 
6.5 Do you think that the rig company should do more than they do today to learn from 
successful operations? If "Yes", what should they do, where should they start? 
 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 We want to return to the opening question again; what are the reasons that the rig 
has not experienced a major accident like Deepwater Horizon (or a similar accident)?  
 
7.2 Are there questions we should have asked that we have not asked?  
 
7.3 Is there something urgent you want to share at the end of the interview? 
 
Thank you for your time and thank you for sharing your thoughts and experiences in this 
interview. The information is of great value for us. 
 
 
